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Abstract
In interference-limited wireless networks, interference management techniques are im-
portant in order to improve the performance of the systems. Given that spectrum and
energy are scarce resources in these networks, techniques that exploit the resources ef-
ficiently are desired. We consider a set of base stations operating concurrently in the
same spectral band. Each base station is equipped with multiple antennas and trans-
mits data to a single-antenna mobile user. This setting corresponds to the multiple-input
single-output (MISO) interference channel (IFC). The receivers are assumed to treat in-
terference signals as noise. Moreover, each transmitter is assumed to know the channels
between itself and all receivers perfectly. We study the conflict between the transmitter-
receiver pairs (links) using models from game theory and microeconomic theory. These
models provide solutions to resource allocation problems which in our case correspond
to the joint beamforming design at the transmitters. Our interest lies in solutions that
are Pareto optimal. Pareto optimality ensures that it is not further possible to improve
the performance of any link without reducing the performance of another link.
Strategic games in game theory determine the noncooperative choice of strategies of
the players. The outcome of a strategic game is a Nash equilibrium. While the Nash
equilibrium in the MISO IFC is generally not efficient, we characterize the necessary
null-shaping constraints on the strategy space of each transmitter such that the Nash
equilibrium outcome is Pareto optimal. An arbitrator is involved in this setting which
dictates the constraints at each transmitter. In contrast to strategic games, coalitional
games provide cooperative solutions between the players. We study cooperation between
the links via coalitional games without transferable utility. Cooperative beamforming
schemes considered are either zero forcing transmission or Wiener filter precoding. We
characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the core of the coali-
tional game with zero forcing transmission is not empty. The core solution concept
specifies the strategies with which all players have the incentive to cooperate jointly in
a grand coalition. While the core only considers the formation of the grand coalition,
coalition formation games study coalition dynamics. We utilize a coalition formation
algorithm, called merge-and-split, to determine stable link grouping. Numerical results
v
show that while in the low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime noncooperation between
the links is efficient, at high SNR all links benefit in forming a grand coalition. Coalition
formation shows its significance in the mid SNR regime where subset link cooperation
provides joint performance gains.
We use the models of exchange and competitive market from microeconomic theory to
determine Pareto optimal equilibria in the two-user MISO IFC. In the exchange model,
the links are represented as consumers that can trade goods within themselves. The
goods in our setting correspond to the parameters of the beamforming vectors neces-
sary to achieve all Pareto optimal points in the utility region. We utilize the conflict
representation of the consumers in the Edgeworth box, a graphical tool that depicts
the allocation of the goods for the two consumers, to provide closed-form solution to
all Pareto optimal outcomes. The exchange equilibria are a subset of the points on the
Pareto boundary at which both consumers achieve larger utility then at the Nash equi-
librium. We propose a decentralized bargaining process between the consumers which
starts at the Nash equilibrium and ends at an outcome arbitrarily close to an exchange
equilibrium. The design of the bargaining process relies on a systematic study of the
allocations in the Edgeworth box. In comparison to the exchange model, a competitive
market additionally defines prices for the goods. The equilibrium in this economy is
called Walrasian and corresponds to the prices that equate the demand to the supply
of goods. We calculate the unique Walrasian equilibrium and propose a coordination
process that is realized by the arbitrator which distributes the Walrasian prices to the
consumers. The consumers then calculate in a decentralized manner their optimal de-
mand corresponding to beamforming vectors that achieve the Walrasian equilibrium.
This outcome is Pareto optimal and lies in the set of exchange equilibria.
In this thesis, based on the game theoretic and microeconomic models, efficient beam-
forming strategies are proposed that jointly improve the performance of the systems.
The gained results are applicable in interference-limited wireless networks requiring ei-
ther coordination from the arbitrator or direct cooperation between the transmitters.
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Chapter 1.
Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Wireless broadband networks1 provide mobile users with high data rate services. In
these networks, base stations are associated with coverage areas called cells. Mobile
users located in these cells are granted access to high-speed data services from the
corresponding base stations. The wireless connections between the base stations and
the users enable user mobility.
Due to spectrum scarcity, universal frequency reuse is a prerequisite in wireless broad-
band networks [BPG+09]. The transmissions from all base stations are at the same
frequencies and at the same time. Nevertheless, in order to support the increasing
number of users, small cells (femto cells) are to be deployed [DMC+12, LMF+11] to
increase the network coverage and reduce the load on existing base stations (macro
cells). The base stations are to be equipped with multiple antennas in order to in-
crease the cell spectral efficiency through multiplexing and spacial diversity techniques
[KFV06, ACH07, LLL+10].
Having universal frequency reuse as well as dense deployment of base stations, in-
terference becomes the main source of performance degradation in the network. The
interference at a mobile user can be distinguished between intra-cell interference and
inter-cell interference. Intra-cell interference at a user originates from the transmis-
sion of the associated base station to other users in the same cell. Intra-cell interfer-
ence is usually managed through orthogonal multiple access methods [ACH07]. These
methods divide the available resources (frequency, time, code, space) into orthogonal
resource blocks. A set of resource blocks is then allocated to a single user for trans-
mission. Inter-cell interference, on the other hand, is caused by transmissions in other
1Such as IEEE 802.16 systems and Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Long Term Evolution
(LTE).
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(arbitrator)
transmitter
receiver
coordinator
Figure 1.1.: The transmitters are connected to the arbitrator which coordinates their
choice of beamforming vectors.
cells. Inter-cell interference is to be mitigated by interference management techniques
[KFV06, ACH07, BPG+09, LLL+10].
Interference management techniques aim at coordinating the transmissions between
the cells. The processing complexity for this purpose is desired to be at the base sta-
tions. In general, the base stations are larger in size and are capable to carry out larger
computational overhead than the mobile users. Accordingly, the number of antennas
at the base stations will be much larger than at the mobile users [ACH07]. Moreover,
complex processing such as beamforming is to be performed at the base stations. Beam-
forming is a technique for transmitting (or receiving) the desired signal from multiple
antennas to maximize the signal power in desired spacial directions. If the base station
knows the channels between itself and all receivers, then beamforming can reduce or
even null the interference at unintended receivers while maintaining acceptable signal
power at the intended receiver [ACH07, GHH+10].
We distinguish between two models for interference management between the cells:
1. The first model requires a central controller which coordinates the transmissions of
the base stations. This setting is illustrated in Figure 1.1. We refer to the central
controller as the arbitrator. The arbitrator can acquire any necessary information
from all transmitters.
2. The second model relies on direct communication between the base stations. This
setting is illustrated in Figure 1.2. The base stations in this setting can exchange
necessary information for cooperative transmissions.
2
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transmitter
receiver
Figure 1.2.: The transmitters are directly connected to each other for signaling regarding
the joint choice of beamforming vector.
Both mentioned models rely on the existence of backhaul connections which already
exist in wireless broadband network standards [Raz11]. In the context of coordination or
cooperation between the base stations, the base stations are to be regarded as intelligent
systems [KFV06, AKG11]. With this respect, game theoretic models are appropriate to
describe the interaction between the base stations.
1.2. Interference Channels
The interference channel (IFC) [CT91] is a mathematical model which describes a set-
ting in which multiple transmitter-receiver pairs operate in the same spectral band.
In Figure 1.3, a two-user IFC is illustrated. Transmitter 1 sends useful information
to receiver 1, and transmitter 2 sends useful information to receiver 2. Each receiver
receives a superposition of the signals sent from both transmitters. At receiver 1 (anal-
ogously receiver 2) the signal from transmitter 2 interferes on the intended signal from
transmitter 1.
The standard form in Figure 1.3 is a representation of the IFC after specific normal-
ization [Car78]. The direct channel coefficients are unity. The interference channel gain
from transmitter 1 to receiver 2 is a. The channel gain from transmitter 2 to receiver
1 is b. Transmitter 1 and transmitter 2 have a total transmission power of P1 and P2,
respectively. The signals at receiver 1 and 2 are
y1 = s1 + bs2 + n1, y2 = as1 + s2 + n2, (1.1)
3
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1
1
a
b
transmitter 1
transmitter 2
receiver 1
receiver 2
s1
s2
y1
y2
Figure 1.3.: Two-user interference channel.
respectively, where si is the message transmitted from transmitter i ∈ {1, 2}. The noise
terms are ni ∼ CN (0, 1), i ∈ {1, 2}. If both receivers treat interference signals as noise,
then achievable rates at receiver 1 and 2 with single user decoding (SUD) are
R1 = log2
(
1 +
P1
1 + bP2
)
, R2 = log2
(
1 +
P2
1 + aP1
)
, (1.2)
respectively.
The capacity region of an interference channel is composed of all jointly achievable
data rates. Finding the capacity region of the IFC in general is still an open problem.
In [Cos85], an overview of the results on the capacity region of the interference channel
is provided. In [Car78], it is shown that if interference is very high (a ≥ 1 + P2 and
b ≥ 1 + P1), then it can be decoded and subtracted from the intended signal. In this
case, the capacity region has a rectangular shape. In [HK81] and [Sat81], it is shown
that in the strong interference regime (a ≥ 1 and b ≥ 1), an achievable rate region is
the intersection of two multiple access channel capacity regions. The largest known rate
region for the interference channel is according to the Han-Kobayashi scheme [HK81].
Recently, it has been proven that the Han-Kobayashi scheme is within one bit from the
capacity region of the IFC [ETW08].
In this thesis, we consider the multiple-input single-output (MISO) IFC [VJ04]. All
transmitters are equipped with multiple antennas while all receivers use single antennas.
1.3. Transmit Beamforming
In this section, we briefly discuss how transmit beamforming techniques can be applied
for interference management in interference networks. In Figure 1.4, a transmitter and
two receivers are illustrated. The transmitter uses N antennas. The channel vectors
from the transmitter to receiver 1 and 2 are h1 ∈ CN and h2 ∈ CN , respectively. At
each transmit antenna i the transmitted symbol s is multiplied by the complex weight
wi ∈ C. The beamforming vector used at the transmitter is w = [w1, . . . , wN ]T . A total
4
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h2
×w1
s ×w2
×
transmitter receiver 1
y1+
n1
wN
receiver 2
y2+
n2
h1
Figure 1.4.: An illustration of a transmitter with N antennas and two receivers with
single antennas.
power constraint P at the transmitter is a constraint on the sum of powers used at the
antennas:
N∑
k=1
|wk|2 = ‖w‖2 ≤ P. (1.3)
Beamforming is a signal processing technique which enables the possibility to increase
the radiation power in desired directions while reducing the radiation power in unde-
sired directions [BO01, GSS+10]. Transmit beamforming exploits the knowledge of the
downlink channels. In order to acquire channel knowledge at the transmitter several
techniques are discussed in [BO01]. In time-division duplex (TDD) systems, reciprocity
between the uplink and downlink channels can be used to estimate the channel at the
transmitter using training data from the receivers. Another method of obtaining channel
knowledge at the transmitter is by estimating the channel at the receiver and forwarding
the channel information to the transmitter via a feedback link.
In Figure 1.4, assume receiver 1 is the intended receiver of the transmitter and receiver
2 is the unintended receiver. The transmitter can maximize the power gain at receiver
1 by matching the beamforming vector w to the channel h1. The beamforming design
for this purpose is called maximum ratio transmission (MRT). Moreover, it is possible
to null the received signal power at receiver 2 when the beamforming vector w is chosen
orthogonal to the channel vector h2. The beamforming design which maximizes the
power at receiver 1 and nulls the interference power at receiver 2 corresponds to zero
forcing (ZF) transmission.
We illustrate the effect of transmit beamforming by an example. Assume the trans-
mitter uses a linear antenna array [Hay96] and the single-antenna receivers are located
in the far field of the array. Moreover, the intended receiver is located at 0 degrees while
the unintended receiver is at an angle of 30 degrees from the normal of the array. The
channels are assumed to be quasi-static block flat fading. In Figure 1.5, MRT array
5
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Figure 1.5.: Array pattern for a two-element linear array. The solid and dashed lines cor-
respond to the maximum ratio transmission and cooperative beamforming,
respectively.
pattern, plotted in solid line, achieves highest power gain at the intended receiver and
also high interference gain at the unintended receiver. The array pattern for a choice
of beamforming vector desired to mitigate interference at receiver 2 is plotted with the
dashed line. It can be observed that the power gain at the intended receiver is less than
the gain achieved with MRT. However, the interference gain is reduced significantly.
1.4. Conflict Analysis and Resource Allocation
Economic theory is concerned with efficient allocation of limited resources to economic
agents. The economic agents represent individuals that have the desire to possess the
valuable resources. The scarcity of the resources brings up a conflict between the indi-
viduals on how to distribute the resources among them.
Microeconomic theory [JR03, MCWG95] is a field in economics which studies eco-
nomic agent behavior in markets. The economic agents represent both consumers and
producers of goods. While generally the goods in a market can be said to flow directly
between the consumers, prices are usually considered as means of trade for the goods.
Producers sell their goods at the markets which make them accessible to the consumers
at specified prices as is illustrated in Figure 1.6. Consumers on the other hand, are
endowed with monetary budget which enables them to buy the goods. The consumers
naturally have preferences over the available goods. Each consumer determines his de-
mand of the goods according to his budget and preferences. The prices of the goods are
adapted depending on the overall amount of goods demanded by the consumers as well
as their supply by the producers. This interaction between the producers and consumers
6
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$
p 2
$
p n
consumer 1 producer 1
consumer 2 producer 2
consumer K producer J
market 1
market 2
market n
good 2
good n
good 1$
p 1
Figure 1.6.: Illustration of an economic model with J producers of n goods. The goods
are sold at markets which determine their prices. The K consumers buy
goods from the markets.
at markets can be studied using tools from microeconomic theory.
The behavior of economic agents plays a major role in determining the state of an
economic system [Mye08]. Each economic agent is a decision-maker which seeks choices
between different alternatives with the attempt to increase his wealth. His preference
over the available goods is usually represented by a utility function. The behavior of
the economic agent must conform with the maximization of his utility function. That
is, after observing the market prices, quantities of goods are bought by the consumers
in such a way that their utilities are maximized. Important in this behavior is that an
economic agent is not aware of the structure of the market and the factors that lead to
the prices of the goods. In other word, each economic agent takes prices as given and
is incapable of altering them. Different market structures as well as their equilibria are
discussed in Section 1.4.1.
Game theory is created by von Neumann and Morgenstern in The Theory of Games
and Economic Behavior [vNM44] to provide tools for studying economic behavior. The
reason for creating game theory is due to the fact that the mathematical methods used
in economic analysis have not been adequate to analyze complex economic dynamics
[Leo95]. With this respect, game theory is concerned with modeling conflict situations
and providing solutions that range between competitive and cooperative individuals.
The individuals in game theory are considered to be more intelligent than in microe-
conomic theory [Mye99]. Each individual maximizes his utility function having the
7
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Figure 1.7.: Distinction in equilibrium concepts in microeconomic theory.
awareness of the entire market structure. As in microeconomic theory, the solutions of
conflict situations in game theory rely on notions of stability. We discuss game theoretic
models in Section 1.4.2.
Resource allocation problems arise in multiuser wireless scenarios [HL08]. There, mul-
tiple users can share the wireless channel for communication. Multiple-access schemes
are concerned with efficient allocation of the channel resources to the users. The re-
sources may be time-slots in time-division multiple access (TDMA), frequency bands
in frequency-division multiple access (FDMA), code in code-division multiple access
(CDMA) or space in space-division multiple access (SDMA). These resources can be
regarded as valuable goods which the base station (producer) has to allocate to the
users (consumers).
1.4.1. Microeconomic Theory
Two main building blocks of microeconomic theory is consumer theory and the theory
of the firm [JR03]. Consumer theory deals with the decisions made by a consumer to
maximize his preference. The theory of the firm studies production plans of a firm
aimed at maximizing its profit. The solution concepts in microeconomic theory are dis-
tinguished between partial equilibrium theory and general equilibrium theory [JR03].
This distinction is illustrated in Figure 1.7. In partial equilibrium theory, the changes
in one market are assumed not to affect the prices in other markets. In general equi-
librium theory, the prices in different markets are connected. That is, a change in the
price of one good leads to a change in the prices of other goods. The study in microeco-
nomic theory is also classified according to market structures. Market structures can be
distinguished between the least competitive (pure monopoly) to the most competitive
(perfect competitive markets).
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Partial Equilibrium Theory
We discuss the partial equilibrium in three market structures corresponding to pure
monopoly, Cournot oligopoly and Bertrand oligopoly. The equilibrium in Cournot
oligopoly and Bertrand ologopoly is related to the Nash equilibrium in game theory
which is discussed in Section 1.4.2.
In a pure monopoly, there exists a single firm which produces quantities of the same
good. There exists a set of consumers which buy quantities of this good. In this setting,
the monopolist does not need to consider any actions or competition from other firms.
The monopolist maximizes his profit by determining the amount of the good to be
produced as well as the good’s price. An oligopoly is a more competitive market model
in comparison to pure monopoly. In a Cournot oligopoly, there exists a set of firms
which sell quantities of the same good on a common market. The market determines
the price of the good depending on its total supply. The profit of a firm is the gain
from selling its goods minus the cost for producing these goods. In a Cournot oligopoly,
each firm has to determine independently the amount of the good to produce. The
Cournot equilibrium, proposed by Cournot in 1838, corresponds to a Nash equilibrium
of a strategic game between the firms. The formulation of a strategic game as well as its
solution are presented in Section 1.4.2. In contrast to a Cournot oligopoly, in a Bertrand
oligopoly each firm can determine the price of its produced good independently. The
consumers buy the goods only from the firm that provides the lowest prices. Therefore,
the firm which sets the lowest price is the only firm that sells its good. The equilibrium
in this setting corresponds to the prices set by the firms such that each firm’s profit is
zero.
General Equilibrium Theory
In perfect competitive markets, there exists a set of K consumers K = {1, . . . , K} and
a number n of divisible goods. The total amount of good i ∈ {1, ..., n} is ci and has
a unit price of pi. Define the vector of prices for the goods as p = [p1, . . . , pn]. Each
consumer is initially endowed with a budget bk which he uses to buy goods. The budget
set of consumer k is defined as
Bk = {x ∈ Rn+ : pT x ≤ bk}. (1.4)
In the Arrow-Debreu market model, it is assumed that each consumer is initially en-
dowed with amount of goods instead of a fixed monetary budget. Define the endowment
vector of consumer k as ek =
(
ek1 , . . . , e
k
n
)
. The budget of consumer k is the revenue
9
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gained from selling his bundle of goods ek at the given prices. Hence, in the Arrow-
Debreu market model, the budget of consumer k is bk = pT ek.
Each consumer chooses the amount of goods to buy without taking into account the
decisions of the other consumers. This leads to a distributed decision-making of the
consumers. Each consumer k has a utility function uk : [0, c1]×· · · × [0, cn] → R+ which
reveals his preference over the goods. A consumer k demands quantities of goods to
maximize his utility function. Thus, the demand function dk = [dk1 , . . . , d
k
n] of consumer
k, depending on the prices of the goods, is defined as:
dk(p) = arg max
x∈Bk
uk(x). (1.5)
The general equilibrium in competitive markets is due to Walras [Wal74] and describes
the state at which the prices of the goods are chosen such that the demand of each good
equals its supply, i.e.
K∑
k=1
dki (p
∗) = ci, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (1.6)
The existence of a Walrasian equilibrium2 is guaranteed if the following conditions are
satisfied [JR03, Theorem 5.5]:
• the consumer utility function uk(x) is continuous, strongly increasing3, and strictly
quasiconcave4 on Rn+,
• the endowment of each good is strictly positive, i.e., ∑Kk=1 eki > 0 for all i ∈
{1, . . . , n}.
In a competitive market, the properties of the aggregate excess demand of the goods
plays an important role in the analysis of the Walrasian equilibrium. The aggregate
excess demand of good i is defined as [JR03, Definition 5.4]:
zi(p) =
K∑
k=1
dki (p) − ci, (1.7)
where dki (p) is consumer k’s demand of good i in (1.5). Let z(p) = [z1(p), . . . , zn(p)].
Walras’ law is formulated as [JR03, Section 5.2]:
pT z(p) = 0. (1.8)
2We will use the term Walrasian equilibrium to refer to the distribution of the goods according to the
Walrasian prices and also to the corresponding utilities of the consumers.
3A function f : D → R with D ⊂ Rn is strongly increasing if f(x′) > f(x) whenever x′ ≥ x (the
inequality is componentwise) and x′ 6= x [JR03, Definition A1.17].
4A function f : D → R with D ⊂ Rn is strictly quasiconcave if and only if, for all x′ 6= x in D,
f(tx′ + (1 − t)x) > min {f(x′), f(x)} for all t ∈ (0, 1) [JR03, Definition A1.25].
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Walras’ law implies that if the excess demand is larger than zero in one market, then
the excess demand in another market must be negative.
The existence of a unique Walrasian equilibrium depends on the properties of the
aggregate excess demand function. The aggregate excess demand z(p) in (1.7) has the
gross substitute property if when the price of one good i is increased from pi to p′i, and the
prices of the other goods stay the same, then zj([p1, . . . , pi−1, p′i, pi+1, . . . , pn]) > zj(p) for
j 6= i [MCWG95, Definition 17.F.2]. If the aggregate excess demand satisfies the gross
substitute property, then there exists at most one Walrasian equilibrium [MCWG95,
Proposition 17.F.3]. In order to reach the Walrasian equilibrium, a price adjustment
process (tâtonnement process) is required. Specifically, if the demand of one good is
larger than its supply, the price of this good is increased. On the other hand, if a
good is supplied in quantities larger than its demand then its price is reduced. If
the aggregate excess demand has the gross substitute property, then the tâtonnement
process is globally convergent [ABH59]. In Section 4.2, we use the competitive market
model to characterize the Walrasian equilibrium in the two-user MISO IFC.
Pareto demonstrated that the Walrasian equilibrium in competitive markets is effi-
cient according to his optimality criterion [SZ95]. In [Par94], Pareto formulated the
optimality criterion which indicates that an efficient allocation of the resource to the
individuals is achieved when a redistribution of the resources reduces the wealth of at
least one individual. The interesting property of the Walrasian equilibrium in compet-
itive markets is that given the behavior of the consumers as willing to maximize their
profits independently leads to a Pareto optimal allocation of the resources. Pareto found
his optimality condition motivated by the multiple optimal points found by Edgeworth
[Edg81] in a setting of exchange between individuals.
In his book Mathematical Psychics [Edg81] in 1881, Edgeworth studied a voluntary
exchange model between economic agents. Each agent is initially endowed with an
amount of goods. The agents bargain on the distribution of the goods. Edgeworth
showed in a two individual setting that starting at an initial distribution of two goods,
there is a set of equilibria at which the two consumers are simultaneously satisfied. He
called the set of points at which the bargaining ends the contract curve. The allocations
on the contract curve satisfy the Pareto optimality criterion5. In Section 4.1, we model
the situation in the two-user MISO IFC as an exchange economy and characterize all
points on the contract curve. Moreover, we construct a bargaining process between the
5The equilibria in the exchange economy of Edgeworth were later discovered by Shubik [Shu59] to
coincide with the core of a coalitional game between the individuals. Coalitional games are discussed
in Section 1.4.2.
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Figure 1.8.: Distinctions in game theory.
MISO links in order to reach a point on the contract curve.
1.4.2. Game Theory
Game theory studies the decisions that individuals, referred to as players, would make in
conflict situations. Each player’s decision depends on the decisions of the other players.
Accordingly, game theory analyzes the decisions the players would make when they
interact. Game theory is built on the assumption that the players are rational and
intelligent decision-makers [LR57, Mye84]:
• Rationality: The behavior of a player follows the maximization of his utility func-
tion.
• Intelligence: The players are capable to comprehend the conflict situation they
are in and know that the other players are also intelligent.
These attributes of the players are understood under the term “rational players” [LR57].
In game theory, the distinction is made under noncooperative and cooperative games.
In cooperative games, the players cooperate by choosing their actions jointly to achieve
a jointly acceptable solution. Noncooperative games, on the other hand, assume that
each player independently chooses his actions taking the actions of the other players as
fixed. The foundations of noncooperative games are due to John Nash [Mye99]. While
the players can be regarded as either noncooperative or cooperative, the distinction in
game theory is made according to the form of the game [OR94]. There exists three
game forms: The strategic form, the extensive form, and the coalitional form. Strategic
and extensive form games are noncooperative games while coalitional form games are
cooperative games. This distinction is illustrated in Figure 1.8. In this thesis, we do not
use extensive form games. The interested reader is referred to [OR94, Section 6] for the
theory. Next, we will describe noncooperative games in strategic form and cooperative
games in coalitional form.
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The Strategic Form
A game in strategic form 〈K, (Ak)k∈K, (uk)k∈K〉 [OR94, Section 2.1] is composed of three
elements. The set K = {1, . . . , K} consists of the players. Each player k has a strategy
space Ak from which he can select his actions. Each element of Ak is a pure strategy and
resembles a deterministic choice of action of player k. Alternatively, a mixed strategy of
a player k is the choice of a pure strategy in Ak with a certain probability. That is, each
player k can randomize between different pure strategies in his strategy set Ak. In this
thesis, we do not consider the possibility of mixed strategies for the players. The utility
function of a player k is uk : A1 × · · · × AK → R+. The utility function describes the
preferences of a player depending on the strategies of all players. A player k in a game
in strategic form can only choose strategies from his own strategy set Ak to maximize
his utility function.
The solution of a game in strategic form is a Nash equilibrium [Nas50b]. The Nash
equilibrium describes the noncooperative outcome between the players as each player
maximizes his utility given the actions of others. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium
[OR94, Definition 14.1] of a strategic game is a strategy profile (aNE1 , ..., a
NE
K ) ∈ A1 ×
· · · × AK such that for every player k ∈ K
uk(a
NE
1 , . . . , a
NE
K ) ≥ uk(aNE1 , . . . , aNEk−1, ak, aNEk+1, . . . , aNEK ), for all ak ∈ Ak. (1.9)
A Nash equilibrium is composed of a set of strategies for each player with the property
that if one player changes his strategy unilaterally he would reduce his payoff. In
Figure 1.9, the Nash equilibrium is illustrated. The illustration shows how the utility
point would change if a player changes his strategy alone while the other player chooses
the Nash equilibrium strategy. In Section 3.1, we study strategic games in the MISO
IFC.
A Nash equilibrium may not always exist in pure strategies. However, the existence
of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed when the players use mixed strategies [Nas50b].
Conditions for existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium are provided
in [Ros65].
The best response of a player k to the strategies of the other players is a strategy or set
of strategies from Ak that maximize player k’s utility function. The Nash equilibrium
is a stable state at which each player chooses his best response to the strategies of the
other players. Thus, the Nash equilibrium can be reached by a series of best responses.
In strategic games, best response dynamics are studied [BO98] in order to examine
whether the Nash equilibrium can be reached. Global stability of a Nash equilibrium
means that a Nash equilibrium is reached by a series of best responses starting from
13
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Figure 1.9.: Illustration of a Nash equilibrium.
any strategy profile.
Bayesian games [Mye83] are strategic games in which the players have uncertainty
about the other players. A player’s incomplete information can be about the utility
functions or the strategy spaces of the other players. In these games, each player has
private information which the other players do not know. The private information at
player k is described by his type tk. All types of a player k are included in the set
Tk. Given his type tk, player k builds beliefs on what the other players’ types are.
The subjective probability πk(t1, . . . , tk−1, tk+1, . . . , tK |tk) describes player k’s beliefs
about the other players’ types given his type is tk. In Bayesian games, a player chooses
the strategy which maximizes his expected utility function over all possible types of
the other players. The equilibrium of a game with incomplete information is called a
Bayesian equilibrium.
The Coalitional Form
Games in coalitional form describe possible cooperation between players. Unlike in
noncooperative games, cooperative games consider joint decisions of the players. A
game in coalitional form without transferable utilities 〈K, X , V, (uk)k∈K〉 [OR94, Section
13.5] is described by four elements: The set of players is K and is called the grand
coalition. The set X is the set of consequences which consists of all jointly possible
actions of the players. The mapping V assigns to every coalition S ⊆ K a subset of the
set X . The utility function of a player k is uk : X → R+.
The above definition of a coalitional game is general and can represent any game
with transferable utilities. In a coalitional game with transferable utilities, the sum of
the payoff of the players in a coalition S (the worth of a coalition S) is represented
14
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by the characteristic function ν(S) ∈ R [LR57, Chapter 8]. In coalitional games with
transferable utilities, the worth of a coalition can be divided arbitrarily between its
members.
Solution concepts of coalitional games characterize a stable element or set of stable
elements in the set of consequences X . The first criterion for an element of the set X to
be stable is for it to be an imputation. An imputation is an element x ∈ X satisfying
uk(x) ≥ uk(V ({k})) for all k ∈ K [OR94, Section 14.2]. In words, an imputation is a
strategy profile with which each player k gets a higher utility than being noncooperative.
If a strategy profile x ∈ X is not an imputation, then there exists a player that would
not agree to x since he can achieve a higher utility when acting on his own. Let I ⊆ X
be the set of all imputations. An objection of coalition S to the imputation y is an
imputation x such that uk(x) > uk(y) for all k ∈ S.
The core of a coalitional game is the set of imputations to which there exists no
objection by any coalition S. We use the core solution concept in the MISO IFC in
Section 3.2.1. Another solution concept of coalitional games is the stable set proposed
by von Neumann and Morgenstern [vNM44]. The stable set F of a coalitional game
is a subset of all imputations in I which satisfies the internal and external stability
conditions [OR94, Definition 279.1]:
• Internal stability: If x ∈ F then for no z ∈ F does there exist a coalition S for
which uk(z) > uk(x) for k ∈ S.
• External stability: If z ∈ F\I then there exists an element y ∈ F such that
uk(y) > uk(z) for k ∈ S and for some coalition S.
While the core solution is a unique set, the stable set might not be unique. That is,
there might be several stable sets of a coalitional game. There are other solutions to
coalitional games such as the bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value.
The interested reader is referred to [OR94, Chapter 14] and also to [LJ11] for a brief
introduction.
The above described solutions of coalitional games determine joint strategies of the
players such that players would cooperate in a grand coalition and no coalition has
the incentive to deviate and act on its own. Coalition formation games [AD74, Mar07]
describe situations in which the players can dynamically group to form a coalition struc-
ture. A coalition structure is a partition of the grand coalition K into a set of disjoint
coalitions. In coalition formation games, a partition function assigns to each coalition
structure the worth of each coalition. The stability of a coalition structure ensures that
no set of players can deviate to form another coalition structure. Different coalition
15
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formation models are mentioned in the survey papers [Gre94, Yi03]. In [vNM44], von
Neumann and Morgenstern proposed a coalition formation model, where each player
proposes a set of players to build a coalition with. If a set of players have simultane-
ously proposed each other, then the coalition forms. In [DG80], an individually stable
coalition formation model is proposed. In this model, only a single player is allowed to
join a coalition in the existing coalition structure. An individually stable contractual
equilibrium is formulated which requires that a player could only change coalitions when
this is beneficial for him, to all the members of the coalition which he joins, and all the
members of the coalition which he leaves. It is shown that this equilibrium always exists
and it is possible to design a dynamic process that yields in a finite number of steps an
equilibrium. In Section 3.2.2, we use a coalition formation algorithm which is based on
merging and splitting of coalitions to reach a stable coalition structure. This coalition
formation mechanism has been proposed in [AW09].
Cooperative games can be also solved by bargaining problems6. A bargaining problem
between K players is defined by 〈U , d〉, where U ⊂ RK is the utility set and d ∈ U is
called the threat point or disagreement point. If the players could not reach an agreement,
then their utilities correspond to the threat point. The solution of a bargaining problem
is a unique point in U . In [Nas50a], Nash formulated a cooperative solution to a two-
player bargaining problem with a convex utility set U . The Nash bargaining solution
(NBS) uNBS is based on four axioms [Pet92]7:
• Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO): There exists no x ∈ U such that x > uNBS (the
inequality is componentwise). This means that the players cannot jointly improve
their outcome from the NBS.
• Symmetry (SYM): If d1 = · · · = dK and the utility space U is symmetric, i.e. for
any point x ∈ U the permutation of the coordinates of x leads to a point x′ ∈ U ,
then uNBS1 = · · · = uNBSK .
• Scale Transformation Covariance (STC): The bargaining problem 〈aU +b, ad+b〉
with a, b ∈ RK and a > 0 has the NBS auNBS +b where uNBS is the NBS of 〈U , d〉.
• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): Given two bargaining problems
〈U , d〉 and 〈Ũ , d̃〉 with d = d̃ and U ⊂ Ũ and the NBS of 〈Ũ , d̃〉 is ũNBS ∈ U then
the NBS of 〈U , d〉 is also ũNBS.
6Bargaining problems can be represented by games in coalitional form [OR94, Chapter 15].
7We describe the axioms using the NBS.
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The NBS satisfies the above axioms and solves the following problem [Pet92, Definition
2.1]:
maximize
∏
k=1,...,K
(uk − dk)
subject to (u1, . . . , uK) ∈ U .
(1.10)
The NBS is the point in the utility set which dominates the threat point and maximizes
the volume of the box created with the points d and uNBS. Other bargaining solutions
from axiomatic bargaining theory, such as the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution [KS75]
and the egalitarian bargaining solution are described in [Pet92].
17
Chapter 1. Introduction
18
Chapter 2.
System Model and Problem Formulation
2.1. System and Channel Model
Consider a set K := {1, ..., K} of transmitter-receiver pairs (links) operating concur-
rently in the same spectral band. Each transmitter k is equipped with Nk ≥ 2 antennas,
and each receiver with a single antenna. This setting is illustrated in Figure 2.1 and
corresponds to the K-user multiple-input single-output (MISO) interference channel
(IFC).
The quasi-static block flat-fading channel vector from transmitter k to receiver ℓ is
denoted by hkℓ ∈ CNk×1. Each transmitter k uses a transmit beamforming vector wk
from its feasible strategy space Ak defined as
wk ∈ Ak := {w ∈ CNk×1 : ‖w‖2 ≤ 1}, (2.1)
where we assumed a total power constraint of one (w.l.o.g.). The basic model for the
matched-filtered, symbol-sampled complex baseband data received at receiver k is1
yk = h
H
kkwksk +
∑
ℓ 6=k
hHℓkwℓsℓ + nk, (2.2)
where sk ∼ CN (0, 1) is the symbol transmitted by transmitter k and nk ∼ CN (0, σ2)
are the noise terms. Throughout, we define the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) as 1/σ2.
A strategy profile is a joint choice of strategies of all transmitters defined as
(w1, ..., wK) ∈ X := A1 × · · · × AK . (2.3)
Given a strategy profile, the signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) of link k is
γk(w1, ..., wK) =
|hHkkwk|2
σ2 +
∑
ℓ 6=k |hHℓkwℓ|2
, (2.4)
1For ease of notation, we conjugate the true channels h̃kℓ such that hkℓ = h̃
∗
kℓ.
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Figure 2.1.: Illustration of a K-user MISO IFC. The transmitters use multiple antennas
while each receiver uses a single antenna. The solid arrows represent the
links’ intended channel vectors. The dashed arrows represent the interfer-
ence channel vectors.
which results in the achievable rate
Rk(w1, ..., wK) = log2(1 + γk(w1, ..., wK)), (2.5)
when single-user decoding (SUD) is assumed at receiver k, i.e., the receiver treats inter-
ference as noise. The achievable rate region is defined as
R :=
{
(R1(w1, ..., wK), . . . , RK(w1, ..., wK)) ∈ RK+ : (w1, ..., wK) ∈ X
}
, (2.6)
which is the set composed of all jointly achievable rates. In the rate region R, rate tuples
can be ranked according to their Pareto efficiency. A rate tuple (R′1, . . . , R
′
K) ∈ R
is Pareto superior to (R1, . . . , RK) ∈ R if (R′1, . . . , R′K) ≥ (R1, . . . , RK), where the
inequality is componentwise and strict for at least one component. The transition from
(R1, . . . , RK) to (R′1, . . . , R
′
K) is called a Pareto improvement [JR03, Chapter 4.3.2].
Situations where Pareto improvements are not possible are called Pareto optimal. These
points constitute the Pareto boundary of the rate region. Formally, the set of Pareto
optimal points of R are defined as [Pet92, p. 18]
P(R) := {x ∈ R : there is no y ∈ R with y ≥ x, y 6= x}, (2.7)
where the inequality in (2.7) is componentwise. The Pareto boundary is a subset of the
weak Pareto boundary defined as [Pet92, p. 14]
W(R) := {x ∈ R : there is no y ∈ R with y > x}, (2.8)
where the inequality in (2.8) is componentwise.
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Figure 2.2.: Illustration of a two-user rate region.
In Figure 2.2, a two-user rate region is illustrated. The weak Pareto boundary is
the set of outermost points in the rate region. The Pareto boundary is a subset of the
weak Pareto boundary which has the additional property that it is impossible to strictly
improve the rate of a link from the current operating point without affecting the rates of
the other links. Accordingly, Pareto optimality is stronger than weak Pareto optimality.
A single user point of a link k is its maximum achievable rate when all other links switch
their transmission off. The links’ coexistence brings the conflict that the links cannot
achieve the rates in their single user points simultaneously. This is mainly due to the
interference coupling between the links which degrades their performance. In the MISO
IFC rate region, efficient operating points must be Pareto optimal. Otherwise, it is
possible to improve the rate of at least one link without affecting the rates of the other
links. Next, we will provide the necessary beamforming vectors required to operate at
any Pareto optimal point.
By observing that the achievable rate of a link k in (2.5) is monotonically increasing
with the direct power gain |hHkkwk|2 for fixed interference powers |hHℓkwℓ|2, k 6= ℓ. In
addition, the rate of link k is monotonically decreasing with the interference power gain
for fixed intended power gain. Pareto optimal beamforming requires a tradeoff between
maximizing the intended power gain and minimizing interference gains generated at
unintended receivers.
In the two-user MISO IFC, the set of efficient beamforming vectors for each transmit-
ter k ∈ {1, 2} are parameterized by a single real-valued parameter as [JLD08, Corollary
1]
wk(λk) =
√
λk
Πhkℓhkk
‖Πhkℓhkk‖
+
√
1 − λk
Π⊥hkℓhkk
‖Π⊥hkℓhkk‖
, k 6= ℓ, (2.9)
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Figure 2.3.: Illustration of a power gain region.
where λk ∈ [0, λMRTk ] with λMRTk = ‖Πhkℓhkk‖2/‖hkk‖2. The set of beamforming vector
in (2.9) includes maximum ratio transmission (MRT) for λk = λMRTk such that
wk(λ
MRT
k ) = w
MRT
k =
hkk
‖hkk‖
, (2.10)
and also zero forcing transmission (ZF) for λk = 0 such that
wk(λk = 0) = w
ZF
k =
Π⊥hkℓhkk
‖Π⊥hkℓhkk‖
, k 6= ℓ. (2.11)
In (2.9), the set of beamforming vectors necessary for Pareto optimal operation are
characterized for each transmitter independently. This set includes the two special
beamforming vectors, MRT and ZF, where MRT beamforming maximizes the intended
power gain, while ZF nulls the interference at the unintended receiver.
In [Jor10], the concept of power gain region associated with a transmitter is developed
in order to characterize efficient beamforming in the K-link case. The power gain
region of a transmitter k is the set of all achievable power gains from this transmitter
to all receivers. In Figure 2.3, a two-dimensional power gain-region is illustrated for
transmitter 1. The direction vectors e1, e2, and e3 refer to three different parts of the
boundary of the power gain region. The boundary part corresponding to e2 includes
the maximum achievable power gain at receiver 1 and also zero power gain at receiver 2.
These extreme points correspond to MRT and ZF transmission strategies, respectively.
Using the power gain region concept, the beamforming vectors necessary to achieve
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any Pareto optimal point in the rate region R are parameterized as [MJ11, Theorem 2]:
wk(ξk1, . . . , ξkK) = pkvmax


ξkkhkkh
H
kk −
∑
ℓ 6=k
ξkℓhkℓh
H
kℓ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Zk


, (2.12)
where ξkℓ are real nonnegative weights satisfying
∑K
ℓ=1 ξkℓ = 1, and the power allocation
is determined by the following conditions:
pk =



1 µmax(Zk) > 0
[0, 1] µmax(Zk) = 0
0 µmax(Zk) < 0
. (2.13)
The number of required real-valued parameters to determine the efficient beamforming
vectors for each transmitter k in (2.12) is K − 1. For a transmitter k, power control in
(2.13) is needed when the downlink channels hkℓ, ℓ ∈ K, from transmitter k are linearly
dependent. In this case, the largest eigenvalue of Zk for specific choice of parameters can
be less than zero. If the downlink channels from transmitter k are linearly independent,
then µmax(Zk) is always strictly larger than zero except for ξkk = 0.
2.2. Problem Formulation and Contributions
In this section, we formulate the problems studied in this thesis and state our contribu-
tions accordingly. Moreover, we provide the references to the papers and articles (listed
at the end of this section) where the results have been already published.
Our results are motivated by the fact that the Nash equilibrium in the MISO IFC,
investigated in Section 3.1.1, is generally inefficient [LDJ08, LJ08]. With this respect,
our problem formulations are concerned with the improvement of the performance of
the links from the Nash equilibrium through coordination or cooperation mechanisms.
In Chapter 3, noncooperative and cooperative models from game theory for beam-
forming design in MISO IFC are used. The problem statements of this chapter are
formulated in Problem 1 and Problem 2.
Problem 1. What are the necessary constraints on the strategy space of each transmitter
to achieve a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium?
Problem 1 is studied in Section 3.1.2. We consider a strategic game between the
links in which the strategy space of each transmitter is constrained by null-shaping
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constraints. Null-shaping constraints at a transmitter prohibit its transmission in spe-
cific spacial dimensions. We characterize the necessary null-shaping constraints for each
transmitter such that the Nash equilibrium of the resulting strategic game is Pareto
optimal. Here it is assumed that the arbitrator sets the constraints at each transmitter.
This result has been published in [MJ11b].
Problem 2. How would the links cooperate to jointly improve their rates with simple
non-iterative transmission schemes such as zero forcing transmission or Wiener filter
precoding?
Problem 2 is studied in Section 3.2. We use coalitional games in the MISO IFC to
determine possible cooperation between the links. The conditions for nonempty core of
the coalitional game with ZF beamforming are characterized. These conditions state
when the links can jointly improve their rates by joint cooperation with ZF transmission.
In Section 3.2.2, a coalition formation game is formulated in which distinct sets of links
can cooperate with ZF beamforming or Wiener filter precoding. We utilize an algorithm
called merge-and-split in Section 3.2.3 to determine stable coalition structures according
to which joint performance improvement from the Nash equilibrium is achieved. These
results have been published in [MJ11a].
The next problems deal with the two-user MISO IFC and are studied using models
from microeconomic theory in Chapter 4.
Problem 3. What are the necessary and sufficient beamforming vectors that achieve
all Pareto optimal points in the two-user MISO IFC SINR region?
Problem 3 is studied in Section 4.1. We use a model of exchange in the two-user
MISO IFC. The links are regarded as consumers that possess goods corresponding to
the parameters of the efficient beamforming vectors in (2.9). The consumers in this
setting can trade the goods between themselves. We exploit the Edgeworth box to illus-
trate the distribution of the goods between the consumers. In the Edgeworth box, the
contract curve corresponds to the distributions of the goods that lead to Pareto optimal
points. We characterize the contract curve in closed-form in Section 4.1.1. Moreover,
we determine the exchange equilibria in Section 4.1.2 which are Pareto optimal points
that dominate the Nash equilibrium. These results have been published in [MJ11c] and
the journal version in [MJ12a].
Problem 4. How to design a cooperative bargaining process that requires low signaling
overhead between two links and terminates at an exchange equilibrium?
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Problem 4 is studied in Section 4.1.3. The exchange equilibria characterized in Sec-
tion 4.1.2 are candidates for the outcomes of a bargaining process between the two
consumers (links). The bargaining process is iterative and structured in bargaining-
steps. At each bargaining-step, communication between the transmitters is needed in
the form of signaling. Our design of the bargaining process relies on a systematic study
of the allocations in the Edgeworth box. Accordingly, we propose a bargaining process
which requires two-bit signaling from each transmitter at each bargaining-step and is
guaranteed to converge to an outcome arbitrarily close to an exchange equilibrium. This
result has been published in [MJHG10].
Problem 5. How to coordinate the beamforming vectors of the two links to achieve an
exchange equilibrium?
Problem 5 is considered in Section 4.2. The competitive market model in Section
4.2 extends the exchange model in Section 4.1 by defining prices for the goods. The
equilibrium of a competitive market is the Walrasian equilibrium and corresponds to the
prices that equate the demand to the supply of goods. We characterize the Walrasian
equilibrium prices in Section 4.2.2 and prove its uniqueness. In addition, we propose
a coordination process, realized by the arbitrator, to reach the Walrasian equilibrium
in Section 4.2.3. The Walrasian equilibrium lies in the set of exchange equilibria, i.e.,
dominates the Nash equilibrium. These results have been published in [MJ11c] and the
journal version in [MJ12a].
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2.3. Related Work
In this section, we first describe works that characterize Pareto optimal operating points
in MISO IFC as well as works that design distributed coordination mechanisms to im-
prove the performance of the links. Afterwards, we mention works that apply tools from
game theory and microeconomic theory for resource allocation problems in communica-
tion networks.
2.3.1. Beamforming in Interference Channels
The problem of jointly optimizing the transmit beamforming vectors at the transmitters
to meet a global objective of system efficiency in the MISO IFC has been the study of
several recent works. Achieving a Pareto optimal point in the rate region requires finding
the corresponding joint beamforming vectors to be used at the transmitters. The set
of feasible beamforming vectors for each transmitter is an N -dimensional complex ball
where N is the number of used antennas. In [LDL11], it is found that the complexity
of the problem for finding desirable Pareto optimal operating points in the MISO IFC
such as the maximum weighted sum-rate and proportional-fair rate points is NP-hard.
Therefore, characterizing the necessary beamforming vectors that lead to Pareto optimal
points is valuable to reduce the complexity of finding efficient operating points. Works
with this objective are discussed next.
Characterization of Pareto Optimal Points
The importance of characterizing the set of beamforming vectors necessary for the links’
Pareto optimal operation is twofold: First, the set of relevant beamforming vectors to
consider for finding a Pareto optimal point is reduced to a relatively small subset of
all feasible beamforming vectors. Second, this set is parameterized by a number of
scalars which reduces the complexity for indicating the required beamforming vectors.
The work in [JLD08] was an initiation for characterizing the set of necessary transmis-
sion strategies to achieve all Pareto optimal points in the MISO IFC with interference
treated as noise at the receivers. The efficient beamforming vectors are parameterized
by K(K −1) complex-valued parameters, where K is the number of links. The proposed
parametrization reveals that only a small subset of all feasible beamforming vectors are
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necessary for Pareto optimal beamforming. For the special two-user case, the efficient
beamforming vectors are proven to be a linear combination of MRT and ZF. Thus,
two real-valued parameters are required each between zero and one to characterize all
Pareto optimal operating points. Based on this characterization, a monotonic opti-
mization framework is developed in [JL10] for the two-user case to find the maximum
weighted sum-rate, proportional-fair rate, and max-min solution that lie on the Pareto
boundary of the rate region.
In [KL10], the problem of maximizing the rate of one link while fixing the rate of the
other link in the two-user MISO IFC is solved by a feasibility second order cone program
(SOCP). Accordingly, only points on the Pareto boundary of the two-user MISO IFC are
obtained. Recently in [LKL11a], the parametrization for the two-user case in [JLD08]
is used to characterize in closed form the beamforming vectors necessary and sufficient
to achieve all Pareto optimal points, i.e. a single real-valued parameter is needed to
characterize all Pareto optimal points in the two-user MISO IFC.
In [ZG09], the Pareto boundary of the two-user MISO IFC rate region is parameter-
ized by two real-valued parameters each between zero and infinity. This parametriza-
tion relies on the virtual SINR framework proposed in [RFLT98] and relates to the
parametrization in [JL10]. The virtual SINR framework in [RFLT98] is based on a du-
ality between the uplink and the downlink in the MISO IFC. This framework is exploited
for solving the problem of minimizing total network transmit power subject to SINR
requirements at the receivers. A more general duality between the uplink and downlink
in MISO channels is constructed in [DY10] for a multicell setting with multiple users
served in each cell. The problem of minimizing transmitted power subject to receiver
SINR requirements is solved considering different types of transmit power constraints.
The K(K − 1) complex-valued parametrization in [JL10] for the K-user case has
been recently improved to a K(K − 1) real-valued parametrization in [SCP11, ZC10,
MJ11]. In [SCP11], the K-user MISO IFC is considered with the capabilities of time-
sharing (scheduling) the resources between the links. The optimality of single-stream
beamforming to achieve all Pareto optimal points is proven. Moreover, a parametrization
of the beamforming vectors that achieve all points on the Pareto boundary of the MISO
IFC rate region is provided requiring K(K − 1) real-valued parameters each between
0 and π. In [ZC10], the authors characterize the Pareto boundary of the MISO IFC
through controlling interference levels at the receivers. The necessary beamforming
vectors to achieve all Pareto optimal points are parameterized by K(K − 1) real-valued
parameters each between zero and infinity. Interestingly, the acquired parametrization
for K users in [ZC10] is similar as in [ZG09] for the case of full power transmission.
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However, the optimality of the proposed parametrization in [ZG09] is only studied for
the two-user case. The necessary beamforming vectors to achieve all Pareto optimal
points in a general MISO setting is characterized in [Jor10, MJ11]. The characterization
exploits the concept of power gain region associated with a transmitter. The power gain
region illustrates the efficient tradeoff between maximizing intended power gains and
minimizing interference at unintended receivers. Accordingly, efficient transmission can
be characterized in any setting in which the utility functions are monotonic in received
power gains. The number of required parameters in a MISO setting with T transmitters
and K receivers is T (K − 1) where each parameter is between zero and one.
Specific points on the Pareto boundary of the MISO IFC rate region can be com-
puted using monotonic optimization techniques [Tuy00]. These methods exploit the
monotonicity properties of a global objective function. The optimal solution is found
by systematically partitioning the utility space and removing regions where the solution
may not lie. Monotonic optimization techniques require high computational complex-
ity. However, they provide computational structure to solve nonconvex optimization
problems which possess the monotonicity properties in the optimization variables. In
[RTSH11], a global objective function is used which incorporates as special cases the
maximum weighted sum-rate, proportional-fair rate, and max-min solutions. These
points are found by a branch and bound algorithm in the MISO IFC and MISO BC.
Monotonic optimization has been recently applied in [LZC12] to calculate the maximum
weighted sum-rate in the SISO, SIMO, and MISO IFC. Moreover, monotonic optimiza-
tion is exploited in [UB12] to calculate the maximum weighted sum-rate, proportional-
fair rate, and max-min points in a multicell setting with multiple users in each cell. The
framework also solves the problem of optimal time-sharing between the users.
Characterization of Pareto optimal points in cooperative multicell settings is con-
ducted in [BZGO10, BBO12, BJBO11]. In cooperative multicell settings, signals in-
tended for the users can be transmitted from multiple base stations in order to enhance
the overall system performance. In [BZGO10], all Pareto optimal beamforming vec-
tors for both cases of perfect and partial CSI at the transmitters are parameterized by
K(K −1) complex-valued parameters. For perfect CSI at the transmitters and including
dynamic transmitter cooperation for common receiver transmission, a parametrization
of the efficient beamforming vector is provided in [BBO12] with general linear transmit
power constraint at the transmitters. The number of required parameters is K + L − 1,
where L is the number of linear transmit power constraints. For per transmitter power
constraint, 2K − 1 parameters are required each between zero and one. Thus, an im-
provement to the parameterizations requiring K(K − 1) real-values is achieved. Also in
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[BBO12], the calculation of each point on the Pareto boundary is done by using a bisec-
tion method and a quasi-convex feasibility problem. In [BJBO11], a general framework
for multicell multicarrier transmission with dynamic cooperation between the transmit-
ters is provided with general transmit power constraints. Optimality properties such
as single-stream beamforming and the conditions for full power transmission are char-
acterized. Moreover, a parametrization of the Pareto optimal beamforming vectors is
provided with KC + L real-valued parameters each between zero and one, where C and
L are the number of subcarriers and the number of linear transmit power constraints,
respectively. Considering a single carrier and per transmitter power constraints, the
number of parameters in [BJBO11] is 2K. In a multicell MISO setting with uncer-
tainty in CSI at the transmitters, robust Pareto optimal beamforming is obtained by
robust fairness-profile optimization in [BZBO12]. All Pareto optimal points in the per-
formance region are achieved requiring K − 1 real-valued parameters. In addition, a
monotonic optimization algorithm is applied to achieve specific Pareto optimal points
such as maximum sum and proportional fair performance points.
In the case of partial CSI at the transmitters, characterization of the Pareto optimal
transmit covariance matrices for the two-user MISO IFC is done in [LLJ10]. In [LKL09],
it is shown that the characterization in [LLJ10] with the restriction of single-stream
beamforming is a combination of MRT and ZF beamforming. Also with the restriction
of single-stream beamforming, the Pareto boundary of the two-user MISO IFC with
partial CSI at the transmitters is calculated in [KGLL09] using semidefinite relaxation
and semidefinite programming (SDP). The problem is cast as maximizing the rate of
one link while fixing the rate of the other.
All the results mentioned above hold for the case of single-user decoding (SUD) ca-
pabilities at the receiver, i.e., the receivers treat interference as noise. Considering
multi-user decoding (MUD) capable receivers, the necessary Pareto optimal beamform-
ing vectors in the two-user MISO IFC is characterized in [HGJM11]. In [LKL11b], an
efficient algorithm is proposed for the computation of Pareto optimal points in the rate
region with MUD capabilities.
Coordination Mechanisms
The real-valued parametrization for the two-user case in [JLD08] has been important for
designing efficient distributed resource allocation schemes. In [HG08], this parametriza-
tion is utilized to propose a bargaining algorithm that requires two-bit signaling between
the transmitters. Starting in joint MRT (Nash equilibrium), the transmitters reduce
their beamforming parameters in each iteration by an equal step-length leading to joint
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increase in the links’ rates. In [LK10], a similar algorithm is proposed for the cases
of perfect and imperfect CSI. At each iteration, each transmitter optimizes its trans-
mission to reduce a fixed amount of interference power at unintended receivers. Both
algorithms in [HG08] and [LK10] terminate when at least one link experiences reduction
in its outcome. While both algorithms improve the joint performance of the systems
from the Nash equilibrium, these outcomes are not Pareto optimal. Extension to the
precoding design in MIMO IFC is done in [HG10].
In [ZC10], a distributed algorithm is proposed that is performed between link pairs
in the MISO IFC. The transmitters exchange interference levels in each iteration and
optimize their transmission such that these interference levels are met at unintended
receivers. The interference levels are updated based on a necessary condition for Pareto
optimality. Although this condition is not proven to be also sufficient, numerical evi-
dence shows that the algorithm converges to a Pareto optimal outcome almost surely.
In [LDL11], after deriving the complexity results on finding specific Pareto optimal
points in the MISO IFC, a distributed algorithm is proposed to find Pareto optimal
points such as the maximum sum-rate. The proposed algorithm requires perfect local
CSI at transmitters as well as the exchange of scalar values regarding received powers
in each iteration. The algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a local optimum. In
[QZLC11], distributed algorithms are proposed where the computational load of Pareto
optimal beamforming vectors is distributed and carried out sequentially at the trans-
mitters. The algorithms terminate at Pareto optimal points requiring the exchange of
the optimization parameters between the transmitters.
In the K-user MISO IFC, a low complexity one-shot coordination mechanism is pro-
posed in [ZG09] in which each transmitter independently maximizes its virtual SINR.
The virtual SINR of a transmitter is the SINR achieved when virtually regarding the
single antenna receivers as transmitters and the actual transmitters as the multi-antenna
receivers. The virtual SINR is maximized by an MMSE beamforming structure. For
the two-user case, the proposed mechanism is proven to be Pareto optimal. The work
in [ZG09] is extended to the precoding design in MIMO settings in [ZHG09]. Further-
more, the extension to cooperative multicell settings is studied in [ZG10] in which all
transmitters know the signals intended to all receivers.
The appealing property of MMSE transmit beamforming is that it only requires
local CSI at a transmitter. Moreover, in cases of low and high SNR, joint MMSE
beamforming is sum-rate optimal because the MMSE beamforming vector converges to
MRT beamforming at low SNR and to ZF at high SNR. This explains the fact that
MMSE transmit beamforming design as in [ZG09] has been proposed in several works
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[HSHS08, LNR+09, LPNV10, PPL11]. In [HSHS08], MMSE beamforming maximizes
the signal-to-leakage plus noise ratio. In [LNR+09], the high SNR approximation of
the sum-rate in a two-user MISO IFC is optimized leading to an MMSE beamforming
design. Extension of [LNR+09] to MISO multicarrier settings is done in [LRB+10]. In
[PPL10], using the high SNR approximation of the weighted sum-rate, suboptimal dis-
tributed beamforming techniques are provided. There, the parametrization in [ZG09]
is utilized to propose a heuristic algorithm which iteratively updates the parameters
to improve the links’ sum-rate. In [VPNL11], the authors study the reciprocity of the
uplink and downlink channels in the MISO IFC when automatic gain control at the
receivers is considered. Automatic gain control adapts the signal power at the receiver
to meet a specifically defined value. The corresponding transmit beamforming design
in the MISO IFC is termed EIG beamforming. In [PNLV11], EIG beamforming is used
with transmit power adaptation such that maximum restricted power levels at each
receiver are not exceeded.
The works in [BN10, DUD11] provide heuristic ZF beamforming schemes in multicell
settings. The objective is to efficiently select a subset of receivers at which interference is
nulled by applying ZF transmission. In [BN10], the transmitters perform ZF to receivers
which are mostly affected by interference. In [DUD11], a successive greedy user selection
approach is applied with the objective of maximizing the system sum-rate.
2.3.2. Game Theoretic and Microeconomic Theory Applications
In this section, related work that applies models from game theory and microeconomic
theory are discussed. While game theoretic models have been used plentifully for re-
source allocation problems in wireless networks, there exists relatively little work that
apply microeconomic models.
Game Theory for Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks
Game theoretic models for resource allocation in wireless networks have been successfully
applied in numerous works. In this section, we only mention a few results to highlight
the advantages in the game theoretic approaches. First, we mention applications of
noncooperative games for distributed resource allocation problems. These include games
in strategic form and in extensive form. Afterwards, we present works that consider
cooperative game theoretic models.
Two-player zero-sum games are considered in [PCL03, JB04] to find robust transmis-
sion strategies for a MIMO link. In [PCL03], worst-case transmission is investigated
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by studying a game between the MIMO link and nature. Nature chooses the chan-
nel matrix, and the transmitter optimizes its strategy to maximize the link capacity.
It is found that robust transmission, corresponding to the Nash equilibrium (min-max
solution), is a transmit covariance matrix with uniform power allocation. In [JB04], ro-
bust transmission according to worst-case interference is studied. Here, nature chooses
the interference covariance matrix from a set of alternatives, and the link optimizes
the transmitter and receiver covariance matrices accordingly. Robust transmission is
determined by the min-max solution.
In distributed resource allocation schemes, each user exploits available local informa-
tion to optimize his utility function independently. Noncooperative game models are
consistent with this approach. If the users (players) independently choose their best
response to the strategies of the other players, the Nash equilibrium is the stable state
at which no player can improve his utility by choosing another strategy. Accordingly,
distributed operating points are Nash equilibria.
In multicarrier SISO IFC, waterfilling power allocation maximizes the rate of a link
for given power allocations of the other transmitters. The global stability of distributed
iterative waterfilling is the stabiliy of the Nash equilibrium of a strategic game between
the links. In [SPB08], conditions for the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and global
convergence of iterative waterfilling are characterized. In the MIMO IFC, analysis of
the Nash equilibrium regarding uniqueness and global stability is done in [SPB09].
Pricing is a mechanism used to enforce distributed system efficiency. For example,
energy-efficiency can be acquired if the utility function of a transmitter is constructed
such that excessive transmission powers are penalized [SMG01, JBN10]. An overview of
distributed energy efficient power control in multiuser systems can be found in [MPS07].
In [SMG01], pricing to reduce transmission powers is applied to achieve joint perfor-
mance improvements in the distributed system. In [JBN10], the Pareto boundaries of
multiple access channels are characterized where the user utilities include linear pric-
ing terms. In SISO MAC, linear pricing has been applied in [SMG02] to improve the
outcome of the users without pricing. The authors in [SMG02] prove the existence and
global stability of the Nash equilibrium by showing that the considered game is a su-
permodular game [Top98]. Supermodular games are a class of noncooperative games
which have interesting properties regarding the structure of the Nash equilibria as well
as the convergence properties of distributed algorithms [AA03]. The properties of super-
modular games have been also exploited in [HBH06, SSB+09]. In [HBH06], distributed
power control in ad hoc networks is studied with pricing determined according to the
generated interference. In [SSB+09], distributed power allocation and beamforming is
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proposed in multi-antenna IFCs. Each link independently maximizes its utility func-
tion taking into account a pricing term which depends on the interference generated
at unintended receivers. Accordingly, the performance of the system is improved in a
distributed fashion.
Games in extensive form have been applied in [LEG08, EPT07, LE11]2. In [LEG08], a
Stackelberg game is proposed in multiple access channels. The base station is the leader
which decides first for the decoding order of the users. The users are the followers which
choose their transmission strategies after the base station. The Stackelberg equilibrium
is shown to achieve the corner points of the capacity region. Moreover in [LEG08], a
repeated game is formulated to achieve points on the Pareto boundary of the capac-
ity region. In [EPT07], after showing that the Nash equilibrium in spectrum sharing
settings is generally inefficient, a repeated game is formulated to provide incentives for
the transmitters to choose their strategies such that the outcome is Pareto optimal.
The bargaining model of alternating offers [Rub82] is successfully applied in [LE11] to
achieve Pareto optimal points in interference channels.
Noncooperative and cooperative game theoretic models for conflict analysis in the
interference channel are discussed in [LJLM09]. In [LJ08], it is shown that MRT is a
dominant strategy for each transmitter in the MISO IFC. That is, each noncooperative
transmitter chooses MRT independent of the beamforming vectors used at the other
transmitters. The Nash equilibrium, corresponding to joint MRT, is shown to be ineffi-
cient in general. Therefore, a cooperative Pareto optimal solution is proposed according
to the Nash bargaining solution (NBS). In [LZ08], the NBS has been characterized for
the multicarrier SISO IFC. The NBS is acceptable for all links since it provides rates
jointly larger than at the Nash equilibrium. Another solution from axiomatic bargain-
ing theory is the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution. In [NS09], the KS is studied in the
MISO IFC and an algorithm is provided to reach the solution. Both the NBS and KS
are desirable outcomes because they are Pareto optimal and give for each player utilities
higher than without cooperation.
Games in coalitional form provide cooperative solutions for resource allocation prob-
lems. A tutorial on the application of coalitional games in wireless networks is given in
[SHD+09]. In [MSM08], transmitter and receiver cooperation of single-antenna links is
considered. Coalitions between transmitters and receivers lead to multi-antenna systems
which enhance the performance of the links. Coalition formation in multiuser systems
is studied in [SHDH09]. Users with single-antennas, initially assigned orthogonal re-
2Stackelberg games, repeated games as well as the game of alternating offers are games in extensive
form [OR94].
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sources, cooperate to form multi-antenna systems. Significant gains are achieved by
using tools from coalitional game theory which provide structured cooperation methods
between the users.
Microeconomic Theory for Resource Allocation in Communication
Networks
Models from microeconomic theory have found a few applications for resource alloca-
tion problems in communication networks. In [Ye07], the competitive market model
is considered for allocating transmit powers to the links sharing a common frequency
band. The links purchase their transmit power subject to budget constraints. An agent,
referred to as the market, determines the unit prices of the power spectra. Existence
of the Walrasian equilibrium is proven and conditions for its uniqueness are provided.
In [LTY09], the work in [Ye07] is extended to the problem of determining the budgets
of the links to satisfy specific user requirements. For example, the links’ budgets are
determined such that all users achieve equal utilities in equilibrium. In [XAY10], the
Walrasian equilibrium is formulated as a linear complementarity problem (LCP) for a
multicarrier setting, and a decentralized price-adjustment process is proposed to reach
the equilibrium. In each iteration, the links send their power demands to the spectrum
manager which adjusts the prices according to the total demand and supply of power.
The work in [XAY10] supports both works in [Ye07, LTY09] in providing a mechanism
to reach the Walrasian equilibrium.
Spectrum trading in cognitive radio is analyzed using microeconomic models in [NH08].
In this setting, primary users sell their owned spectrum to secondary users. Three mod-
els to determine the prices of the spectrum are considered: The first model corresponds
to a competitive market in which the prices are determined according to the Walrasian
equilibrium. The second model is a Cournot oligopoly in which the primary service
providers compete with each other to determine their prices. The equilibrium in this
model corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. The third model considers cooperative pri-
mary users which jointly determine the spectrum prices to maximize their total profit.
Also in cognitive radio settings, hierarchical spectrum sharing is modeled as an inter-
related market in [NH10]. The service in one tier of the hierarchical system sells its
spectrum to the service in the lower tier. The pricing mechanism for the bandwidth al-
locations between the services corresponds to the Walrasian equilibrium, i.e. the supply
equates the demand of the resources. In [TGC10], the Walrasian equilibrium is used for
simultaneous bitrate allocation for multiple video streams. There, the Edgeworth box
[Wal74] is used as a tool to illustrate the efficient allocation of the streams.
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Game Theoretic Applications
This chapter deals with the application of game theory for conflict analysis and resource
allocation in the MISO IFC. The links are assumed to be rational and intelligent as
discussed in Section 1.4.2. In the first section of this chapter, the links are assumed to
be noncooperative. In this case, either there is no possibility of communication between
the links, or an arbitrator is connected to the links to coordinate their actions. In the
second section, we assume that the links can directly communicate with each other. For
this case, cooperative games are applied to determine cooperative solutions between the
links.
3.1. Noncooperative Games
In game theory, games in strategic form determine outcomes of a conflict situation
between noncooperative players. The noncooperative outcome corresponds to strategies
the players would choose if cooperation among them is not feasible. The complexity of
implementing a noncooperative outcome is much less than a cooperative outcome since
the former requires no overhead in communication between the players. If cooperation
between the players is feasible, the noncooperative outcome can be considered as a
threat point or a disagreement point in case cooperation fails. That is, each player
cooperates with another player under the condition that its performance improves from
the noncooperative outcome.
3.1.1. Game in Strategic Form
The players in our setting are the links and a game in strategic form between them is
defined by the tuple [OR94, Definition 11.1]
〈K, (Ak)k∈K, (Rk)k∈K〉, (3.1)
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where K is the set of players, Ak is the strategy space of player k in (2.1), and Rk is the
achievable rate function of player k in (2.5).
The solution of the strategic game in (3.1) is a Nash equilibrium1.
Definition 1. A Nash equilibrium [OR94, Definition 14.1] of a strategic game
〈K, (Ak)k∈K, (Rk)k∈K〉 (3.2)
is a strategy profile (wNE1 , ..., w
NE
K ) ∈ A1 × · · · × AK such that for every player k ∈ K
Rk(w
NE
1 , . . . , w
NE
K ) ≥ Rk(wNE1 , . . . , wNEk−1, wk, wNEk+1, . . . , wNEK ), for all wk ∈ Ak. (3.3)
In words, a Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile in which no player has the incentive
to change his strategy if all other players choose their Nash equilibrium strategy. From
Definition 1, each player would always choose his best response strategy to the strategies
chosen by the other player. That is, each player decides for the strategy in his strategy
set which maximizes his utility given the strategies of the other players. Consequently,
the Nash equilibrium is a state of mutual best responses.
Given a set of beamforming vectors of all other players (w1, . . . , wk−1, wk+1, . . . , wK),
transmitter k’s best response is the beamforming vector wk which maximizes his achiev-
able rate as
maximize
wk∈Ak
log2
(
1 +
|hHkkwk|2
σ2 +
∑
j 6=k |hHjkwj |2
)
. (3.4)
The solution of the above problem is maximum ratio transmission (MRT) written as
wMRTk =
hkk
‖hkk‖
. (3.5)
The MRT beamforming strategy of player k in (3.5) does not depend on the strategies
of the other players. Thus, each transmitter chooses its MRT beamforming vector to
maximize its achievable rate irrespective of the strategy choice of the other transmitters.
Consequently, the Nash equilibrium of our strategic game is unique and corresponds to
joint MRT (wMRT1 , . . . , w
MRT
K ). In addition, the Nash equilibrium of our game belongs
to a strong notion of equilibrium called dominant strategy equilibrium.
Definition 2. A dominant strategy equilibrium [OR94, Definition 181.1] of a strategic
game
〈K, (Ak)k∈K, (Rk)k∈K〉 (3.6)
1The Nash equilibrium in the MISO IFC has been studied in [LDJ08].
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is a strategy profile (w∗1, ..., w
∗
K) ∈ A1 × · · · × AK such that for every player k ∈ K
Rk(w1, . . . , wk−1, w
∗
k, wk+1, . . . , wK) ≥ Rk(w1, . . . , wK),
for all (w1, . . . , wK) ∈ A1 × · · · × AK . (3.7)
In words, a dominant strategy equilibrium consists of the strategies of the players, where
each player chooses his best response strategy irrespective of the strategies chosen by
the other players.
The Nash equilibrium in our game is a state in which the links would operate without
requiring any overhead for communication with one another. However, if the outcome
in Nash equilibrium is not efficient, methods for cooperation or coordination between
the links have to be provided.
The best response of a player k in (3.4) maximizes the intended power gain without
taking into account the interference it generates at the other receivers. Consequently,
interference which is treated as additive noise at the receivers can be uncontrollably
high to degrade the performance of the noncooperative systems. Generally, in spectrum
sharing scenarios the Nash equilibrium is not efficient because each noncooperative
transmitter is indifferent to the amount of interference it generates at the other receivers
[EPT07]. Coexisting noncooperative links can end up in high mutual interference which
leads to saturation in the rates of each system with increasing transmission power.
The efficiency of the Nash equilibrium outcome depends on its distance to the Pareto
boundary of the rate region. In [LJ08], it is shown that the Nash equilibrium is close to
the Pareto boundary in the low SNR regime. In the high SNR regime, zero forcing (ZF)
transmission is near Pareto optimal, while the Nash equilibrium has poor performance
[LDJ08].
In Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2, and Figure 3.3, we plot two-user rate regions2 for −10,
5 and 20 dB SNR, respectively. In Figure 3.1, the Nash equilibrium is near Pareto
optimal while joint ZF has worse performance. In the low SNR regime, noise power
dominates the interference power at each receiver. Hence, the users must maximize the
intended power gain with MRT with which the interference is negligible with respect
to noise. In Figure 3.2, the Nash equilibrium and joint ZF are away from the Pareto
boundary. In Figure 3.3, the Nash equilibrium has bad performance while joint ZF
is near Pareto optimal. At high SNR, the noise power is negligible in comparison to
interference and therefore nulling the interference at unintended receivers with ZF brings
joint improvement to the links’ performance.
2The Pareto boundary of the two-user rate region is plotted using the closed form solution presented
later in Chapter 4.1.
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Figure 3.1.: Two-user rate region at −10 dB SNR.
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Figure 3.2.: Two-user rate region at 5 dB SNR.
A measure called the Price of Anarchy (PoA) quantifies the efficiency of the Nash
equilibrium3. The PoA is defined as the ratio of the maximum sum utility to the sum
utility in the worst-case Nash equilibrium [KP99, Pap01]:
PoA =
maximum sum utility
worst-case sum utility in Nash equilibrium
. (3.8)
If the PoA is one, then the Nash equilibrium coincides with the maximum sum utility
point. If the PoA is two, then two times the sum utility in Nash equilibrium can be
achieved if coordination overhead is made to improve the efficiency of the noncooperative
state. A high PoA is an indication for the necessity of cooperation or coordination
between the players. We compare the Nash equilibrium in our setting to the maximum
3The analysis of the Price of Anarchy in the MISO IFC has been done in [LJLM09].
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Figure 3.3.: Two-user rate region at 20 dB SNR.
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Figure 3.4.: Plot of the Price of Anarchy in the MISO IFC for increasing SNR.
achievable sum rate found by grid search for different SNR values in Figure 3.4. In the
low SNR regime, the Nash equilibrium is sum rate optimal. The inefficiency of the sum
rate in Nash equilibrium increases for increasing SNR.
3.1.2. Constraints for Efficient Nash Equilibrium
The previous section has shown that the Nash equilibrium is generally not Pareto effi-
cient. In this section, we assume that there exists an arbitrator which coordinates the
actions of the players. Specifically, the arbitrator puts null-shaping constraints on the
strategy sets of the players. We characterize the necessary constraints to achieve all
Pareto optimal points in the rate region as Nash equilibria. A null-shaping constraint is
39
Chapter 3. Game Theoretic Applications
a term used in underlay cognitive radio scenarios [GJMS09]. In an underlay cognitive
radio scenario, secondary users can share the communication resources with primary
users under the condition they do not impose quality of service (QoS) degradation to
the primary systems. A limited QoS degradation to the primary users is described
by interference temperature constraints (ITC) [Hay05]. When no interference on the
primary users is allowed, the constraint is said to be a null-shaping constraint [SPPF09].
Let wk be the beamforming vector used at transmitter k, null-shaping constraints in
the directions vk1, . . . , vkL are written as
|wHk vki| = 0, i = 1, . . . , L. (3.9)
In order to be able to fulfill the L null-shaping constraints simultaneously, the number
of applied antennas at the transmitter has to be greater than L.
We apply the null-shaping constraints on the transmissions in our setting. However,
these constraints do not correspond to directions of primary users but are virtually
selected by the arbitrator in order to improve the efficiency of the Nash equilibrium.
The game in strategic form with null-shaping constraints is
〈K, (Ãk)k∈K, (Rk)k∈K〉, (3.10)
where the strategy set of each player k includes the null-shaping constraints as
Ãk = {wk ∈ Ak : |wHk vki| = 0, i = 1, . . . , L}. (3.11)
Accordingly, the null-shaping constraints for a player k reduce his strategy space from
Ak in (2.1) to Ãk. Player k’s dominant strategy, which solves the following problem:
maximize
wk∈Ãk
log2
(
1 +
|hHkkwk|2
σ2 +
∑
j 6=k |hHjkwj |2
)
, (3.12)
is
wk =
Π⊥V k hkk
‖Π⊥V k hkk‖
. (3.13)
where V k = [vk1, . . . , vkL]. Consequently, the beamforming vector in (3.13) is the Nash
equilibrium strategy of the strategic game with null-shaping constraints in (3.10).
Efficient design of null-shaping constraints leads to Pareto optimal points in the
achievable rate region with the applied beamforming vectors having the form of (3.13).
Corollary 1. Assume that the number of antennas at each transmitter is larger than
or equal to the number of links, i.e. Nk ≥ K for all k = 1, . . . , K, and define
Zk(ξk1, . . . , ξkK) = [zk1(ξk1, . . . , ξkK), ..., zkK−1(ξk1, . . . , ξkK)], (3.14)
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with
zki(ξk1, . . . , ξkK) = vi

ξkkhkkhHkk −
∑
ℓ 6=k
ξkℓhkℓh
H
kℓ

, (3.15)
where ξkℓ are nonnegative real weights satisfying
∑K
ℓ=1 ξkℓ = 1. All points on the Pareto
boundary of the rate region R can be achieved by the beamforming vectors
wk(ξk1, . . . , ξkK) =
Π⊥Zk(ξk1,...,ξkK)hkk
‖Π⊥Zk(ξk1,...,ξkK)hkk‖
, k = 1, . . . , K. (3.16)
Proof. The proof is provided in Section 3.3.1.
In Corollary 1, the design of the null-shaping constraints is given in (3.14), and the
efficient transmission strategies are in (3.16). Here, K −1 null-shaping constraints are to
be applied on each transmitter, and the number of required real-valued parameters is the
same as in (2.12). Hence, the complexity of parameterizing the efficient beamforming
vectors is similar in Corollary 1 to the parametrization in (2.12).
Through the design of the null-shaping constraints in Corollary 1, all Pareto optimal
points of the rate region are characterized by transmission strategies that are Nash
equilibria. The interesting observations are as follows. Null-shaping constraints are
sufficient to characterize the Pareto boundary of the MISO IFC rate region. Moreover,
given the null-shaping constraints, the transmitters are required to be noncooperative in
order to achieve efficient operating points. Alternatively, the noncooperative outcome
of the players is more efficient when the players’ strategy sets are made smaller. This is
in analogy with the Braess paradox [Bra68] in traffic planning where investing in new
roads for a traffic network in Nash equilibrium can increase the delay time for each
driver.
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3.2. Cooperative Games
In this section, cooperation between the links is studied using coalitional games. The
links can directly communicate with each other to develop possible cooperation. While
noncooperative transmission of a link corresponds to MRT, we choose two cooperative
transmission schemes which take into account the interference generated at the unin-
tended receivers. These cooperative transmission schemes are zero forcing transmission
and Wiener filter precoding.
3.2.1. Game in Coalitional Form
In game theory, cooperative games are described by games in coalitional form. A game
in coalitional form [OR94, Definition 268.2] is defined by the tuple
〈K, X , V, (Rk)k∈K〉, (3.17)
where K is the set of players, X is the set of possible joint actions of the players in (2.3),
V assigns to every coalition S (a nonempty subset of K) a set V (S) ⊆ X , and Rk is
the utility of player k given in (2.5). A coalition S is a set of players that are willing to
cooperate, and V (S) defines their joint feasible strategies. In this game, the payoff of a
player cannot be transferred to other players in his coalition. The game is said to have
nontransferable utilities.
A coalitional game4 between the links determines the strategy profiles with which all
the links have the incentive to cooperate jointly. This set of strategy profiles makes up
the core of the coalitional game.
Definition 3. The core of a coalitional game [OR94, Definition 268.3] is the set of all
strategy profiles (xk)k∈K ∈ V (K) for which there is no coalition S and (yk)k∈K ∈ V (S)
for which Rk(y1, ..., yK) > Rk(x1, ..., xK) for all k ∈ S.
The core is not empty if there exists no coalition S ⊂ K which can deviate from the
grand coalition and provide its members with payoffs higher than in the grand coalition.
In Definition 3, the players outside coalition S are not explicitly considered in terms
of their choices of strategies. Several models exist that describe the behavior of the
players in K\S [Mar07]. Originally, von Neumann and Morgenstern in [vNM44] and
later elaborated upon in [Aum67], was to consider worst-case behavior. The members
of a coalition S should consider their payoffs which K\S cannot prevent them from
4A tutorial on the application of coalitional games in communication networks can be found in
[SHD+09].
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S
deviation of S
single-player coalition
grand coalition
Figure 3.5.: In the γ-core, no coalition S has the incentive to deviate from the grand
coalition.
achieving (β-core) or alternatively the payoffs that they can guarantee for themselves
(α-core). For our model, it is unusual to think that the links outside a coalition S
would choose their strategies jointly to minimize the payoff of the members of S. We
adopt the γ-model from [HK83] and assume that all players outside a coalition S do
not cooperate, i.e., build single-player coalitions. Coalition deviation in the γ-core is
illustrated in Figure 3.5.
For the cooperation strategies in a coalition S, we consider two simple non-iterative
transmission schemes which can be applied in a distributed manner. These are ZF
transmission and transmit Wiener filter (WF) [JUN05].
Coalitional Game with Zero Forcing Beamforming
The transmitters choose MRT if they are not cooperative, i.e. are in single-player
coalitions. If a transmitter cooperates with a set of links, then it performs ZF in the
directions of the corresponding receivers. Hence, we define the mapping
V ZF(S) = {(wk)k∈K ∈ X : wk = wZFk→S for k ∈ S, wℓ = wMRTℓ for ℓ ∈ K\S}, (3.18)
where wZFk→S is transmitter k’s ZF beamforming vector to the links in S written as
wZFk→S =
Π⊥Zk→S hkk
‖Π⊥Zk→S hkk‖
, Zk→S = (hkℓ)ℓ∈S\{k}. (3.19)
Observe that if the number of antennas Nk < |S|, then ZF in (3.19) is the zero vector,
i.e. transmitter k switches its transmission off. Similar to the definition of the strat-
egy profile V ZF(S) in (3.18), it is possible to consider different cooperative transmit
beamforming than ZF in a coalition. The game in coalitional form with ZF cooperation
is
〈K, X , V ZF, (Rk)k∈K〉. (3.20)
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According to Definition 3, the γ-core is not empty if and only if
Rk(V
ZF(S)) ≤ Rk(V ZF(K)), for all k ∈ S, for all S ⊂ K. (3.21)
The next result provides the condition under which the γ-core of our game is not empty.
Proposition 1. The γ-core of the coalitional game in (3.20) is not empty if and only if
σ2 ≤ σ̄2 := min
S⊂K
min
k∈S



∑
ℓ∈K\S
|hHℓkwMRTℓ |2|hHkkwZFk→K|2
|hHkkwZFk→S |2 − |hHkkwZFk→K|2



. (3.22)
Proof. The proof is provided in Section 3.3.2.
Proposition 1 implies that for all SNR values 1/σ2 ≥ 1/σ̄2, it is profitable for all
players to jointly perform ZF. If a transmitter’s number of antennas is less than the
number of receivers in the network, σ̄2 will be zero since there exists a transmitter
which cannot perform ZF to all receivers. This means that the grand coalition will not
form in this case.
Next, we determine the condition under which no player has the incentive to build a
coalition with other players. In this case, the following must hold:
Rk(V
ZF({k})) > Rk(V ZF(S)), for all k ∈ S, for all S ⊆ K, |S| > 1. (3.23)
Notice that V ZF({k}) = (wMRT1 , ..., wMRTK ) from (3.18). The condition on σ2 for (3.23) to
hold is given in the next result. The proof uses similar steps as the proof of Proposition
1.
Proposition 2. No player has an incentive to build a coalition with another player
using ZF transmission if
σ2 > σ2 := max
S⊆K
max
k∈S



|hHkkwZFk→S |2
∑
ℓ∈K\{k}
|hHℓkwMRTℓ |2 − ‖hkk‖2
∑
ℓ∈K\S
|hHℓkwMRTℓ |2
‖hkk‖2 − |hHkkwZFk→S |2



.
(3.24)
From Proposition 2, we have that for all SNR values 1/σ2 < 1/σ2, it is not profitable
for any user to cooperate with ZF. Figure 3.6 summarizes the results from Proposition
1 and Proposition 2. It can be observed that there is an SNR range in which distinct
subsets of the links can group to build coalitions. This mechanism is studied under
games in partition form in Section 3.2.2.
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Figure 3.6.: Illustration of the conditions for full cooperation (nonempty core) and con-
ditions for no cooperation (single-player coalitions) for ZF coalitional game.
Coalitional Game with Wiener Filter Precoding
Generally, different cooperative transmission scheme can be applied for cooperation
between the links in a coalitional game. In this section, we assume the players cooperate
by performing WF precoding to the players in their own coalition. A transmitter k’s
WF beamforming vector for coalition S is written as
wWFk→S =
(Iσ2 +
∑
ℓ∈S\{k} hkℓh
H
kℓ)
−1hkk
‖(Iσ2 +∑ℓ∈S\{k} hkℓhHkℓ)−1hkk‖
. (3.25)
The WF beamforming vector in (3.25) has interesting behavior for asymptotic SNR
cases [JUN05]. In the high SNR regime (σ2 → 0), wWFk→S converges to wZFk→S in (3.19).
In the low SNR regime (σ2 → ∞), wWFk→S converges to wMRTk in (3.5).
The game in coalitional form with WF precoding is
〈K, X , V WF, (Rk)k∈K〉. (3.26)
where the mapping V WF which defines the strategy profile according to WF cooperation
scheme is
V WF(S) = {(wk)k∈K ∈ X : wk = wWFk→S for k ∈ S, wℓ = wMRTℓ for ℓ ∈ K\S}. (3.27)
Conditions for nonempty γ-core of the coalitional game in (3.26) in terms of an SNR
threshold is hard to characterize because the noise power in (3.25) is inside the matrix
inverse. However, according to numerical simulations, we find that the SNR threshold
above which the γ-core of the coalitional game with WF precoding is nonempty is always
less than that with ZF cooperation. In other words, the SNR range in which the players
have the incentive to jointly cooperate with WF precoding is according to numerical
evidence larger than the SNR range in which the players will jointly cooperate with ZF.
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S1
S2
S3
Figure 3.7.: Illustration of a coalition structure C = {S1, S2, S3}.
3.2.2. Coalition Formation
In the previous section, we have described the γ-core which reveals the feasibility for
the formation of the grand coalition. In this section, we consider coalition formation
games [AD74, Mar07]. These games describe situations in which the players can group
to form a coalition structure. A coalition structure C is a partition of the grand coalition
K into a set of disjoint coalitions {S1, ..., SL} where
⋃L
j=1 Sj = K and
⋂L
j=1 Sj = ∅. In
Figure 3.7, an example coalition structure is illustrated.
We consider two scenarios for player cooperation in a coalition. These scenarios
correspond to ZF and WF transmissions. Given a coalition structure C = {S1, ..., SL},
the strategy profile of the players according to ZF or WF is defined by
F bf(C = {S1, ..., SL}) := {(wk)k∈K ∈ X : wk = wbfk→Sj for k ∈ Sj, j = 1, ..., L}, (3.28)
where bf ∈ {ZF,WF} with wZFk→Sj and wWFk→Sj defined in (3.19) and (3.25), respectively.
Notice that if |Sj | = 1 and k ∈ Sj, then wZFk→Sj = wWFk→Sj = wMRTk . For a coalition
structure C, F ZF(C) is a strategy profile in which each player chooses ZF to the players
in his coalition. Similarly, F WF(C) is the strategy profile when WF is applied.
A comparison relation ⊲ compares two coalition structures C1 and C2. The nota-
tion C1 ⊲ C2 means that coalition structure C1 is preferred to C2. In [AW09], several
comparison relations are discussed. We use the Pareto order relation defined as
C1 ⊲ C2 ⇔
{
Rk(F
bf(C1)) ≥ Rk(F bf(C2)), for all k ∈ K
}
, (3.29)
where the inequality in (3.29) is strict for at least one player k.
In coalition formation games, the stability of a coalition structure is important. A
coalition structure is stable if no set of players has the incentive to deviate and form
a different coalition structure. Coalition deviation is described by a defection function
which maps a coalition structure with all preferable alternatives. In [AW09], a defection
function Dhp is proposed which is based on simple rules of coalitions merging and split-
ting. A coalition structure C is Dhp-stable if the players are not interested in changing C
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through merge and split operations. The merge and split rules thus define a procedure
for coalition formation. This procedure has been applied in [SHDH09] for a wireless
multiple access network.
3.2.3. Merge-and-Split Algorithm
We shortly describe the merge-and-split algorithm [AW09, SHDH09]. The algorithm is
divided into two operations which are executed iteratively. Given C1 = {S1, ..., SL}, the
merge rule merges a set of coalitions T ⊆ C1 to a single coalition if the formed coalition
structure C2 satisfies the Pareto order relation C2 ⊲ C1. This operation is repeated until
no merges are possible.
Merge if C2 ⊲ C1
C1 C2
Figure 3.8.: An illustration of the merge operation.
In the split rule, a coalition Sk ∈ C1 splits into smaller coalitions if the obtained
coalition structure C2 satisfies C2 ⊲ C1. The split rule terminates when no further splits
in any coalition are possible.
C1 C2
Split if C2 ⊲ C1
Figure 3.9.: An illustration of the split operation.
The convergence of the algorithm is guaranteed due to the adopted Pareto order
relation in (3.29). Distributed implementation as well as a discussion on the complexity
of the merge-and-split algorithm can be found in [SHDH09].
We apply the merge-and-split algorithm for coalition formation in our setting. In
order to include the effect of distances between the links on the received power gains,
we use the path loss model in which the signal between a transmitter and a receiver
reduces in power in the rate of a path loss exponent. The path loss exponent depends on
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Figure 3.10.: Distribution of the links in the plane.
the propagation model and takes values between two and four. Let dkℓ be the distance
between transmitter k and a receiver ℓ in meters and α be the path loss exponent, we
write the channel vector hkℓ = d
−α/2
kℓ h̄kℓ with ‖h̄kℓ‖ = 1. In Figure 3.10, we generate
a sample distribution of 8 links in the plane. The transmitters are randomly placed
in a 3 km by 3 km square area. Each receiver k is placed randomly at a distance
dkk = 300 meters away from its transmitter k. We define the SNR as SNR= d
−α
kk /σ
2.
Each transmitter uses 12 antennas and the path loss exponent is set to α = 3. Using the
merge-and-split algorithm, we calculate the user rates at 15 dB SNR in Figure 3.11. At
SNR = 15 dB, the grand coalition forms with WF precoding and the coalition structure
with ZF beamforming is {{4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, {1}, {2}, {3}}, where the coalition {4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
is the cluster of links in the bottom right side of Figure 3.10. With both ZF and WF
cooperation schemes, joint improvement in the rates of the links is achieved from the
Nash equilibrium by link coalition formation.
Using the merge-and-split algorithm, the average rate of the 8 links is plotted for
increasing SNR in Figure 3.12. In the low SNR regime, single-player coalitions exist
with the ZF cooperation scheme supporting the result in Proposition 2. Moreover, at
low SNR it is observed that some players cooperate with WF transmission. This is
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Figure 3.11.: Link rates at 15 dB SNR.
because WF precoding converges to MRT transmission at low SNR. Note that in the
low SNR regime, the outcome with joint MRT is efficient as is revealed in Section 3.1.1.
In the mid SNR regime, coalition formation improves the joint performance of the links
from the Nash equilibrium. It is observed that with WF precoding, larger coalitions form
at lower SNR values than with ZF beamforming which explains the higher performance
gains with WF than with ZF. The optimal ZF and WF coalition structures that achieve
the maximum average user rate are found by exhaustive search. The average user rate
in Nash equilibrium saturates in the high SNR regime. This is contrary to ZF and WF
coalition formation where the average user rate increases linearly due to the formation
of the grand coalition. The formation of the grand coalition at high SNR supports the
result in Proposition 1. It is evident from Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12 that enabling link
coalition formation, even with simple cooperative transmission schemes, leads to joint
performance improvement in the network.
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3.3. Proofs
3.3.1. Proof of Corollary 1
We prove that the gains achieved by the beamforming vectors in (3.16) are equal to the
gains achieved by the beamforming vectors given in (2.12). Define the matrix Mk as
Mk = ξkkhkkh
H
kk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ak
+
∑
ℓ 6=k
−ξkℓhkℓhHkℓ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bk
. (3.30)
The matrices Mk, Ak and Bk are Hermitian matrices of size Nk × Nk. The eigenval-
ues of Mk are real and we always consider them ordered in nondecreasing order, i.e.,
µ1(M k) ≤ µ2(M k) ≤ ... ≤ µNk(Mk). Ak is a positive semidefinite matrix, Ak  0,
and rank (Ak) = 1, i.e.,
0 = µ1(Ak) = . . . = µNk−1(Ak) ≤ µNk(Ak). (3.31)
Bk consists of the sum of the negative of positive semidefinite matrices. Hence, Bk  0
and rank (Bk) ≤ K − 1, which leads to the following properties on the eigenvalues:
µ1(Bk) ≤ . . . ≤ µK−1(Bk) ≤ 0, (3.32)
and
µK(Bk) = . . . = µNk(Bk) = 0. (3.33)
Next, we study the eigenvalues of Mk = Ak + Bk. According to Weyl’s inequality of
the eigenvalues of the sum of Hermitian matrices [HJ85, Theorem 4.3.7] we have
µNk−1(M k) ≤ µNk−1(Ak) + µNk(Bk) = 0, (3.34)
µK(M k) ≥ µ1(Ak) + µK(Bk) = 0. (3.35)
The eigenvalues of M k are ordered in nondecreasing order. Therefore, the following
eigenvalues of Mk are always equal to zero: µK(Mk) = ... = µNk−1(Mk) = 0. In
addition, the smallest K − 1 eigenvalues of M k are nonpositive.
If the dimension of space is larger than the number of receivers, i.e., Nk ≥ K − 1,
then there would be at least Nk − (K − 1) − 1 eigenvalues of M k that are zero. For the
eigenvectors corresponding to those eigenvalues, the eigenvalue equation is written as

ξkkhkkhHkk +
∑
ℓ 6=k
−ξkℓhkℓhHkℓ

vi = 0, (3.36)
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holds for all i = K, . . . , Nk − 1. Then, for all ℓ ∈ K,
(
ξkℓhkℓh
H
kℓ
)
vi = 0, for all i = K, . . . , Nk − 1. (3.37)
The set of eigenvectors {v1, ..., vNk} of Mk in (3.30), form an orthonormal set, i.e.
‖vi‖ = 1 for all i = 1, ..., Nk and vHi vj = 0 for i 6= j. Therefore, we can write∑Nk
ℓ=1 vℓv
H
ℓ = I, which gives
vNkv
H
Nk
= I −
Nk−1∑
ℓ=1
vℓv
H
ℓ
= I − GkGHk = Π⊥Gk ,
(3.38)
where Gk = [v1, ..., vNk−1]. Let the matrix Zk consist of the eigenvectors of Gk excluding
the eigenvectors that satisfy (3.37), i.e.,
Zk = [v1, . . . , vK−1], (3.39)
then for any g ∈ CNk in the space of the channels [hk1, . . . , hkK ] we can write
∣∣∣∣∣g
H Π
⊥
Zk
hkℓ
‖Π⊥Zk hkℓ‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∣∣∣∣∣g
H Π
⊥
Gk
hkℓ
‖Π⊥Gk hkℓ‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2
(3.40)
=
∣∣∣∣∣g
H
vNkv
H
Nk
hkℓ
‖vNkvHNkhkℓ‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2
(3.41)
= |gHvNk |2, (3.42)
where ℓ ∈ K. Hence, the same power gains are achieved with the beamforming vectors
Π
⊥
Zk
hkℓ
‖Π⊥
Zk
hkk‖
and vNk used in (2.12) for the downlink channels [hk1, . . . , hkK].
3.3.2. Proof of Proposition 1
Considering an arbitrary player i in an arbitrary coalition S, we write the condition in
(3.21) as
|hHkkwZFk→S |2
σ2 +
∑
ℓ∈K\S |hHℓkwMRTℓ |2
≤ |h
H
kkw
ZF
k→K|2
σ2
, (3.43)
where we used the signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR) expression in (2.5)
knowing that the logarithm function is monotonically increasing in the SINR. Cross
multiplying the terms in (3.43) and solving for σ2 we get
σ2 ≤
∑
ℓ∈K\S |hHℓkwMRTℓ |2|hHkkwZFk→K|2
|hHkkwZFk→S |2 − |hHkkwZFk→K|2
, (3.44)
which is the condition that a player k in a coalition S prefers the grand coalition K
to S. Note that |hHkkwZFk→S |2 − |hHkkwZFk→K|2 in (3.44) is always positive because ZF
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beamforming nulls more spatial dimensions in K than in S ⊂ K. Since the condition in
(3.21) has to hold for all k ∈ S and all proper subsets S of K, we get the expression in
(3.22).
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Chapter 4.
Microeconomic Theory Applications
In this chapter, models from microeconomic theory are used to characterize equilibria
which are Pareto optimal in the two-user MISO IFC. In the first section of this chap-
ter, an exchange economy model between the links is studied. The parametrization of
the efficient beamforming vectors are regarded as goods which the links, referred to as
consumers, can exchange between themselves. The exchange equilibria are the possible
distribution of the goods at which the consumers are jointly satisfied. These equilibria
are Pareto optimal and dominate the Nash equilibrium of a strategic game between the
links (studied in Section 3.1.1). In order to reach an exchange equilibrium, we construct
a bargaining process between the two links which sequentially updates the amounts of
goods traded between the consumers. In the second section of this chapter, we use a
competitive market model which additionally associates prices to the goods. We char-
acterize the Walrasian equilibrium in this competitive market which is Pareto optimal
and lies in the set of exchange equilibria. In order to implement the Walrasian equi-
librium, a coordination mechanism is proposed which relies on communication between
the consumers and the arbitrator.
4.1. Exchange Economy
In this section, a model of voluntary exchange of goods between two consumers is
described. Each consumer is assumed to be initially endowed with amounts of divisible
goods. The consumers exchange the goods between themselves because this leads to joint
improvement in their utilities. We make the necessary transformation from the two-user
MISO IFC to a setting in which the links are the consumers, and the parameterized set
of efficient beamforming vectors are regarded as goods.
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good 1 good 2
λMRT1
good 1 good 2
possession of consumer 1 possession of consumer 2
λMRT2
Figure 4.1.: Illustration of the initial distribution of the two goods.
4.1.1. Model of Exchange
In the model of exchange proposed by Edgeworth in 1881 [Edg81], there exists a set
of consumers which voluntarily exchange goods they possess to jointly increase their
payoff. The set of consumers corresponds to the two MISO links in our setting. The
goods correspond to the parameters of the beamforming vectors in (2.9), restated here1
wk(λk) =
√
λk
Πhkℓhkk
‖Πhkℓhkk‖
+
√
1 − λk
Π⊥hkℓhkk
‖Π⊥hkℓhkk‖
, k 6= ℓ, (4.1)
where λk ∈ [0, λMRTk ] with λMRTk = ‖Πhkℓhkk‖2/‖hkk‖2. These beamforming vectors are
necessary to achieve all Pareto optimal points in the two-user rate region R in (2.6).
According to the parametrization of the efficient beamforming vectors in (4.1), there
are two goods and λ1 will stand for good 1 and λ2 for good 2. The consumers are
initially endowed with amounts of these goods. We will assume that the links start the
trade in Nash equilibrium. Thus, consumer k is initially endowed with λMRTk from his
good and nothing from the good of the other consumer. Specifically, we define (λMRT1 , 0)
and (0, λMRT2 ) as the endowments of consumers 1 and 2, respectively. In Figure 4.1, the
initial endowments of the consumers are illustrated.
Since during exchange each consumer will possess different amounts from both avail-
able goods, we introduce new variables that indicate these. When consumer k trades an
amount of his good k to consumer ℓ 6= k, this amount will be represented by x(ℓ)k ≤ λMRTk .
The amount left for consumer k from his good is x(k)k = λ
MRT
k − x
(ℓ)
k . In connection to
the parametrization in (4.1), we define the amounts of possessed goods as
x
(k)
k = λk, x
(k)
ℓ = λ
MRT
ℓ − λℓ, ℓ 6= k. (4.2)
If consumer k gives x(ℓ)k to the other consumer, this means that transmitter k uses the
beamforming vector in (4.1) which corresponds to λMRTk − x
(ℓ)
k . Hence, if x
(ℓ)
k increases,
1Throughout this chapter, the indices k, ℓ are restricted to be in the set {1, 2}.
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Figure 4.2.: Illustration of the distribution of the two goods during exchange.
transmitter k reduces the interference at receiver ℓ by using a beamforming vector nearer
to ZF. In Figure 4.2, the distribution of the goods during exchange is depicted.
Consumer Preference
The utility function of a consumer represents his preference over the goods. We use
the SINR expression in (2.4) as the utility function of a consumer k. Because consumer
preference is invariant to positive monotonic transforms [JR03, Theorem 1.2], the results
in this chapter hold for any SINR based utility function such as the achievable rate
function in (2.5). We define the two-user SINR region as
Φ :=
{
(γ1(w1, w2), γ2(w1, w2)) ∈ R2+ : ‖w1‖2 ≤ 1, ‖w2‖2 ≤ 1
}
, (4.3)
where the SINR γk of link k is defined in (2.4). Note that any SINR tuple which is Pareto
optimal corresponds to a Pareto optimal point in the rate region in (2.6). Since the set
of beamforming vectors in (4.1) are necessary to achieve all Pareto optimal points, we
express the SINR of a link k in terms of the parameters λk in (4.1). First, we formulate
the power gains at the receivers depending on the parameters.
Lemma 1. The power gains at the receivers in terms of the parametrization in (4.1)
are
|hHkkwk(λk)|2 =
(√
λkgk +
√
(1 − λk)ǧk
)2
, (4.4)
|hHkℓwk(λk)|2 = λkgkℓ, k 6= ℓ, (4.5)
where λk ∈ [0, λMRTk ] and gk := ‖Πhkℓhkk‖2, ǧk := ‖Π⊥hkℓhkk‖2, gkℓ := ‖hkℓ‖2, k 6= ℓ.
Proof. The proof is provided in Section 4.3.1.
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Figure 4.3.: Preference representation of the consumers. I1 and I2 are indifference curves
of consumer 1 and 2, respectively.
Notice in (4.5) that the interference gain λkgkℓ scales linearly with λk. With this
respect, increasing λk increases the interference at the unintended receiver. We rewrite
the SINR of a link k in terms of the goods as2
φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
=
(√
x
(k)
k gk +
√(
1 − x(k)k
)
ǧk
)2
σ2 + λMRTℓ gℓk − x
(k)
ℓ gℓk
, (4.6)
where we substituted λk = x
(k)
k and λℓ = λ
MRT
ℓ − x
(k)
ℓ , ℓ 6= k, from (4.2). Next, we prove
an important property of the SINR function in (4.6) in relation to the goods.
Theorem 1. φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
in (4.6) is continuous, strongly increasing, and strictly qua-
siconcave on [0, λMRT1 ] × [0, λMRT2 ].
Proof. The proof is provided in Section 4.3.2.
According to Theorem 1, the SINR φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
is strongly increasing [JR03, Defini-
tion A1.17] means that for3
(
x′(k)1 , x
′(k)
2
)
≥
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
and
(
x′(k)1 , x
′(k)
2
)
6=
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
,
it holds that φk
(
x′(k)1 , x
′(k)
2
)
> φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
. Moreover, the SINR φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
is
strictly quasiconcave [JR03, Definition A1.25] means that for all
(
x′(k)1 , x
′(k)
2
)
6=
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
and for all t ∈ (0, 1), the following holds
φk
(
t
(
x′(k)1 , x
′(k)
2
)
+ (1 − t)
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
))
> min
{
φk
(
x′(k)1 , x
′(k)
2
)
, φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)}
. (4.7)
The properties in Theorem 1 imply that the SINR function has a unique maximum over
the set [0, λMRT1 ] × [0, λMRT2 ].
2We give a new notation for the SINR as φk because it depends on the goods while the SINR function
γk is a function of the beamforming vectors.
3The inequalities in the following are componentwise.
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The preference of consumers 1 and 2 over the goods is illustrated in Figure 4.3(a) and
Figure 4.3(b), respectively. For consumer 1 (analogously consumer 2), O1 is the origin
of the coordinate system which has x(1)1 , the amount of good 1, on the x-axis and x
(1)
2 ,
the amount of good 2, on the y-axis. Ik is the indifference curve of consumer k which
represents the pairs
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
such that the consumer achieves the same utility as
with
(
x′(k)1 , x
′(k)
2
)
, i.e., φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
= φ′k := φk
(
x′(k)1 , x
′(k)
2
)
. The indifference curves
correspond to the boundaries of the level sets [BV04] of φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
. According to the
properties of the utility function in Theorem 1, the indifference curves are convex. The
dark region above Ik, corresponds to the pairs
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
where the consumer achieves
higher payoff than at the indifference curve. The region below Ik corresponds to less
payoff for consumer k.
We provide a formulation for the consumer indifference curves. This formulation is
essential for the bargaining process between the consumers later described in Section
4.1.3.
Proposition 3. The indifference curves Ik (x
(k)
k as a function of x
(k)
ℓ ), for given fixed
SINRs φ′k are
I1
(
x
(1)
2 , φ
′
1
)
= f

λMRT1 ,
φ′1
φ1
(
λMRT1 , x
(1)
2
)

, (4.8)
I2
(
x
(2)
1 , φ
′
2
)
= f

λMRT2 ,
φ′2
φ2
(
x
(2)
1 , λ
MRT
2
)

, (4.9)
where f(a, b) :=
(√
ab −
√
(1 − a)(1 − b)
)2
.
Proof. The proof is provided in Section 4.3.3.
Note that Proposition 3 characterizes a family of indifference curves. Each indifference
curve has a domain and range which depends on the fixed SINR value φ′k. For given
fixed SINRs, the indifference curves should be restricted to take values in the feasible
parameter set from (4.1), i.e., I1
(
x
(1)
2 , φ
′
1
)
∈ [0, λMRT1 ] and I2
(
x
(2)
1 , φ
′
2
)
∈ [0, λMRT2 ].
The Edgeworth Box
The Edgeworth box [Edg81], [JR03, Chapter 5], illustrated in Figure 4.4, is a graphi-
cal representation that is useful for the analysis of an exchange economy. The box is
constructed by joining Figure 4.3(a) and Figure 4.3(b). Thus, the Edgeworth box has
two points of origin, O1 and O2, corresponding to consumer 1 and 2, respectively. The
initial endowments of the consumers define the size of the box. The width of the box is
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Figure 4.4.: An illustration of an Edgeworth box.
λMRT1 , and the height is λ
MRT
2 . Let
(
x′(1)1 , x
′(1)
2
)
and
(
x′(2)1 , x
′(2)
2
)
be the possessions of
consumer 1 and consumer 2 during exchange. The point
((
x′(1)1 , x
′(1)
2
)
,
(
x′(2)1 , x
′(2)
2
))
is
the corresponding allocation in the Edgeworth box. Every allocation in the box is an
assignment of a possession vector to each consumer. The consumers’ preferences in the
Edgeworth box can be revealed according to their indifference curves. The dark region
in Figure 4.4 is called the exchange lens and contains all allocations that are Pareto
improvements to the outcome in
((
x′(1)1 , x
′(1)
2
)
,
(
x′(2)1 , x
′(2)
2
))
.
The locus of all Pareto optimal points in the Edgeworth box is called the contract curve
[Edg81]. On these points, the indifference curves are tangent, and are characterized by
the following condition4 [Edg81, MNS53]:
∂φ1
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2
)
∂x
(1)
1
∂φ2
(
x
(2)
1 , x
(2)
2
)
∂x
(2)
2
=
∂φ2
(
x
(2)
1 , x
(2)
2
)
∂x
(2)
1
∂φ1
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2
)
∂x
(1)
2
. (4.10)
The convexity of the consumers’ indifference curves according to Theorem 1 implies that
these can only be tangent at a single point. Thus, the condition in (4.10) is necessary
and sufficient for an allocation to be on the contract curve.
Theorem 2. The contract curve cc : [0, λMRT2 ] → [0, λMRT1 ] (x
(1)
1 as a function of x
(2)
2 ) is
a solution of the following cubic equation5
a
[
x
(1)
1
]3
+ b
[
x
(1)
1
]2
+ c
[
x
(1)
1
]
+ d = 0, (4.11)
4In multiple consumer settings, the condition provided by Edgeworth in (4.10) should hold for every
consumer pair.
5This result is independently obtained in [LKL11a].
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Figure 4.5.: Course of the contract curve in the Edgeworth box for different SNR values.
where
a = −(g1 + ǧ1)(C − g12)2, d = g1σ4, (4.12)
b = (C − g12)
(
2ǧ1(C + σ
2) + g1(2σ
2 + C − g12)
)
, (4.13)
c = −ǧ1(C + σ2)2 + σ2g1(2g12 − 2C − σ2), (4.14)
and C is a function of x
(2)
2 given as
C =
(√
x
(2)
2 g2 +
√
(1 − x(2)2 )ǧ2
)
(√
g2
x
(2)
2
−
√
ǧ2
1−x(2)2
)(
σ2
g21
+ λMRT2 − x
(1)
2
) . (4.15)
The root of interest in (4.11) lies in [0, λMRT1 ] and satisfies
sign
(
σ2/g12 + x
(1)
1 − Cx
(1)
1
)
= sign
(
σ2/g12 + x
(1)
1 + C(1 − x
(1)
1 )
)
. (4.16)
Proof. The proof is provided in Section 4.3.4.
The contract curve characterized in Theorem 2 are all allocations in the Edgeworth
box which are Pareto optimal in the SINR region. Thus, Theorem 2 provides all Pareto
optimal points in closed-form requiring a single real-valued parameter. In Figure 4.5, the
contract curve is plotted in the Edgeworth box for different SNR values. The number
of antennas at the transmitters is two and we generate sample channel vectors. The
contract curve is calculated by taking 103 samples of x(2)2 uniformly spaced in (0, λ
MRT
2 )
to obtain values of x(1)1 . The course of the contract curve for 10 dB SNR is near to the
edge of the Edgeworth box where joint ZF is marked. This means that Pareto optimal
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Figure 4.6.: An illustration of the exchange equilibria in the Edgeworth box.
allocations require either transmitter to choose beamforming vectors near to ZF. For
decreasing SNR, the contract curve moves away from the ZF edge. For low SNR, the
contract curve is then close to the edge with joint MRT. These observations conform
with the analysis in [LJ08] where maximum sum rate transmission is studied in low and
high SNR regimes.
4.1.2. Exchange Equilibria
According to Edgeworth [Edg81], the outcome of an exchange between the consumers
must lie on the contract curve. The set of outcomes at which exchange would settle are
called exchange equilibria and are illustrated in Figure 4.6. The exchange equilibria are
the set of allocations on the contract curve which are bounded by the indifference curves
corresponding to the initial endowments. That is, the exchange equilibria allocations
correspond to all Pareto optimal points which dominate the Nash equilibrium in the
SINR region. With the initial endowments corresponding to the Nash equilibrium, the
corresponding indifference curves can be calculated from Proposition 3. The bounds for
the exchange equilibria, as illustrated in Figure 4.6, can be calculated as the intersection
of the indifference curves starting at the allocations in Nash equilibrium and the contract
curve characterized in Theorem 2.
Relation to the Core
The solution concept by Edgeworth is related to that of coalitional games called the
core [Shu61]. The exchange economy between the two links can be represented as a
coalitional game without transferable payoff [OR94, Chapter 13.5]. A game in coalitional
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Figure 4.7.: An illustration of the exchange equilibria in the SINR region.
form [OR94, Definition 268.2] between the two links is defined by the tuple
〈K, G, V, (φk)k∈K〉. (4.17)
In (4.17), K = {1, 2} is the set of players which consists of the two links. G is called the
set of consequences defined as
G =
{((
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2
)
,
(
x
(2)
1 , x
(2)
2
))
:
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
∈ [0, λMRT1 ] × [0, λMRT2 ]
}
. (4.18)
The mapping V assigns to every coalition S (a nonempty subset of K) a set V (S) ⊆ G,
such that
• V ({1}) = V ({2}) = ((λMRT1 , 0), (0, λMRT2 )),
• V ({1, 2}) =
{((
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2
)
,
(
x
(2)
1 , x
(2)
2
))
∈ G : x(1)k + x
(2)
k = λ
MRT
k
}
,
and φk is the SINR of player k in (4.6).
The core [OR94, Definition 268.3] of the coalitional game in (4.17) is the set of all
allocations
((
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2
)
,
(
x
(2)
1 , x
(2)
2
))
∈ V (K) for which there exists no coalition S ⊆
K and an allocation
((
x′(1)1 , x
′(1)
2
)
,
(
x′(2)1 , x
′(2)
2
))
∈ V (S) for which φk
(
x′(k)1 , x
′(k)
2
)
>
φk
(
x′(k)1 , x
′(k)
2
)
for all k ∈ S. Therefore, the core consists of the allocations which lead
to points on the Pareto boundary of the SINR region and dominate the Nash equilibrium.
Consequently, the core of a coalitional game between the links is the set of exchange
equilibria. The exchange equilibria in the SINR region are illustrated in Figure 4.7.
4.1.3. Bargaining
In this section, we propose a bargaining process between the consumers. The consumers
iteratively exchange amounts of goods within themselves until they reach an exchange
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equilibrium. The bargaining process requires that the consumers be able to communicate
directly with each other and exchange signaling bits. Updating the amounts of goods at
each consumer as well as specifying the signals between the consumers is done by using
the Edgeworth box representation. We systematically study all achievable allocations in
the Edgeworth box taking into account the possible signaling between the transmitters.
Moreover, we take into account that each consumer can only update the distribution of
its own good. That is, each link can only change its own beamforming parameters.
Multistage Bargaining
The bargaining process is sequential and is divided into bargaining-steps. At each
bargaining-step, each consumer chooses an amount of his good to propose to the other
consumer. At a bargaining-step t, consumer 1 proposes x(2)(t)1 to consumer 2, and con-
sumer 2 proposes x(1)(t)2 to consumer 1. In addition, the consumers exchange messages
in order to calculate the proposals in the next bargaining-step. The possession of con-
sumer 1 at a bargaining-step t is
(
x
(1)(t)
1 , x
(1)(t)
2
)
, where x(1)(t)1 is the amount of his good
and x(1)(t)2 is the amount of good from consumer 2. Similarly,
(
x
(2)(t)
1 , x
(2)(t)
2
)
is the pos-
session of consumer 2 at bargaining-step t. We denote an allocation in the Edgeworth
box at a bargaining-step t as
x(t) :=
((
x
(1)(t)
1 , x
(1)(t)
2
)
,
(
x
(2)(t)
1 , x
(2)(t)
2
))
. (4.19)
Recall that each allocation in the Edgeworth box is a distribution of the goods which
corresponds to a beamforming vector for each transmitter in the parameterized set in
(4.1).
The bargaining process is structured in stages. A bargaining-stage, indexed with s,
can span several bargaining-steps as illustrated in Figure 4.8. If at a bargaining-step
t, t > s, a Pareto improvement is achieved to the SINRs in the current bargaining-
stage, then we set s = t. This means that a new bargaining-stage begins each time a
Pareto improvement is achieved. At each bargaining-step, the consumers compare their
outcomes to their current stage outcome (corresponding to bargaining-step s). In the
first stage, s = 0, the possessions of the consumers correspond to the Nash equilibrium.
Next, we describe how the consumers choose their proposals at each bargaining-step
and also what messages are they to signal to each other.
Bargaining Process
We assume that each consumer k knows his SINR φk
(
x
(k)(t)
1 , x
(k)(t)
2
)
at bargaining-step
t as well as his SINR φk
(
x
(k)(s)
1 , x
(k)(s)
2
)
for the current stage s. We define the following
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bargaining-step
Pareto improvement
bargaining-stage
s s st t + 1
Figure 4.8.: An illustration of the bargaining steps and stages during the bargaining
process.
capabilities for each consumer:
• consumer k keeps track of a step-length δ(t)k < λMRTk at each bargaining-step t.
The step-length is required in order to increment or decrement the amount of
good proposed to the other consumer. The initial value of the step-length is set
prior to the bargaining process as δ(0)k < λ
MRT
k .
• consumer k can change the sign of the step-length δ(t)k and also reduce its length
by multiplying it with θk ∈ (0, 1).
• consumer k can choose three types of proposals to consumer ℓ, ℓ 6= k, at bargaining-
step t + 1. These are:
(I) x(ℓ)(t+1)k = x
(ℓ)(t)
k
(II) x(ℓ)(t+1)k = x
(ℓ)(t)
k + δ
(t+1)
k
(III) x(ℓ)(t+1)k = λ
MRT
k − Ik
(
x
(k)(t)
ℓ , φk
(
x
(k)(s)
1 , x
(k)(s)
2
))
Proposal type (I) does not change the amount of good k proposed to consumer
ℓ 6= k from the previous bargaining-step. Proposal type (II) increases or decreases
the proposed amount of good k depending on the sign of δ(t+1)k . Proposal type
(III) achieves for consumer k the same SINR value as his current stage outcome
φk
(
x
(k)(s)
1 , x
(k)(s)
2
)
when consumer ℓ proposes x(k)(t)ℓ . The indifference curve func-
tion Ik is defined in Proposition 3.
• consumer k sets Γℓ = true if consumer ℓ, ℓ 6= k, chooses proposal type (III) at the
current bargaining-step. Otherwise, consumer k sets Γℓ = false unless he also
chooses proposal type (III).
In Figure 4.9, six Edgeworth boxes are illustrated. In all boxes, the indifference curves
correspond to the stage allocation x(s). The marked regions in Figure 4.9 resemble the
regions where the allocations x(t), t > s, are possible with respect to the indifference
curves. Note that all regions in the Edgeworth box are covered in the cases in Figure 4.9,
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Figure 4.9.: Six Edgeworth boxes which illustrate the possible positions of the allocation
x(t) of a bargaining-step.
hence all possible positions of x(t) are treated. These cases will aid in the description
of our bargaining process.
Each consumer k can signal to the other consumer one of four signals. This requires
two bits of information to be sent to the other transmitter at each bargaining-step. The
four types of signals are:
• Accept (Ak): A consumer k signals Ak to the other consumer if his SINR has
increased in the current bargaining-step.
• Reject (Rk): A consumer k signals Rk to the other consumer if his SINR has
decreased in the current bargaining-step.
• Not Possible (Nk): A consumer k signals Nk to the other consumer if it is not
possible for consumer k to find a proposal which gives him the same SINR as the
stage SINR.
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• Back (Bk): A consumer k signals Bk to the other consumer if he detects that
the sign of the step-length has to be changed. In this case, if the consumers
previously where incrementing their proposals, after signaling Bk they would start
decrementing their proposals in the next bargaining-steps.
The choice of consumer 1’s proposal (analogously consumer 2) is described in the
flowchart in Figure 4.13. In Figure 4.13, consumer 1 chooses the signaling to consumer
2 based on conditions D1, D2, and D3 (analogously for consumer 2). Condition D1
is true if the current step-length δ(t)1 is below an accuracy measure ǫ. If consumer k
signals Bk, then all consumers alter their initial step-length as δ
(0)
k = −θkδ
(0)
k and set
δ
(t+1)
k = δ
(0)
k . The new proposals are of type (II). This adaptation is necessary since x
(t)
can be in the opposite direction to the exchange lens (proposals in the regions marked
with a prime in Figure 4.9 (E 4)-(E 6)). Since δ(t)1 and δ
(t)
2 always have the same sign,
x(t) will never be in the marked regions in Figure 4.9 (E 1).
Condition D2 is true if consumer 1 achieves an improvement in his payoff. Thus,
consumer 1 accepts the proposal by signaling A1 to consumer 2. Now, consumer 1’s
proposal depends on the signal from consumer 2: If consumer 2 signals A2, then the
allocation x(t) is necessarily in the exchange lens in Figure 4.9 (E 2), i.e., a Pareto
improvement from the stage allocation is achieved. The new stage allocation is set
as x(s) = x(t) and both consumers choose proposal type (II) without altering the step-
lengths. If consumer 2 signals R2, then x(t) is in region (a) in Figure 4.9 (E 3). Consumer
2 chooses proposal type (III) and consumer 1 chooses proposal type (I). This adaptation
is illustrated in Figure 4.9 (E 3) as projecting the allocation x(t) onto I2. Consumer 1
then sets Γ2 = true. If consumer 2 signals N2, then x(t) is in region (a’) in Figure 4.9
(E 6) and above I1. Both consumers then choose proposal type (II) which makes x(t+1)
closer to x(s) than x(t).
Condition D3 is true if consumer 1 cannot find x
(2)(t+1)
1 , given x
(1)(t)
2 , to achieve
the SINR φ1
(
x
(1)(s)
1 , x
(1)(s)
2
)
of the current stage. Having that consumer 1 can choose
the proposals x(2)(t+1)1 ∈ [0, λMRTk ], then φ1
(
x
(1)(s)
1 , x
(1)(s)
2
)
is feasible if it is in the set
F1
(
x
(1)(t)
2
)
defined as
F1
(
x
(1)(t)
2
)
:=
[
φ1
(
0, x(1)(t)2
)
, φ1
(
λMRT1 , x
(1)(t)
2
)]
. (4.20)
Similarly for consumer 2, we define the set
F2
(
x
(2)(t)
1
)
:=
[
φ2
(
x
(2)(t)
1 , 0
)
, φ2
(
x
(2)(t)
1 , λ
MRT
2
)]
. (4.21)
The above defined sets determine whether it is feasible to find a beamforming vector for
a transmitter which achieves an SINR equal to the bargaining stage outcome. This case
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occurs if x(t) is in the region marked in Figure 4.9 (E 6), where x(t) cannot be projected
onto I1 for constant x
(2)(t)
1 . Condition D3 is also true if Γ2 is true, i.e., consumer 2
has chosen proposal type (III) in the previous step. This case reveals that the previous
allocation x(t−1) has been in any of the marked regions in Figure 4.9 (E 4). Each
consumer chooses proposal types (II) after reducing their step-lengths. Hence, x(t+1)
will be closer to x(s). If D3 is false, consumer 1 chooses his proposal according to the
signal from consumer 2: If consumer 2 signals (A2), then this case is analogous to the
case described before when consumer 1 signals A1 and consumer 2 R2. If consumer
2 signals (R2), then x(t) can only be in regions (a) or (a’) in Figure 4.9 (E 5). Both
consumers use proposal types (II) after reducing their step-lengths.
The bargaining process terminates when |δ(0)1 | < ǫ or |δ
(0)
2 | < ǫ. The initial step-length
δ
(0)
k is reduced each time Bk is signaled, i.e., when |δ
(t)
k | < ǫ. The step-length of at least
one consumer is reduced in each bargaining-step, except when Pareto improvements are
achieved. Pareto improvements lead to a reduction in the size of the exchange lens. The
exchange lens vanishes when the indifference curves are tangent, i.e., the allocation is
on the contract curve. Therefore, the bargaining process converges after a finite number
of steps to an outcome arbitrarily close to the contract curve. In the SINR region, the
bargaining outcome is then arbitrarily close to an exchange equilibrium on the Pareto
boundary.
Simulation Results
In Figure 4.10, the Pareto boundary of an SINR region for sample channel realizations
is plotted using the set of efficient beamforming vectors in (4.1) (100 samples are taken
uniformly in [0, λMRTk ]). Joint ZF and the Nash equilibrium (joint MRT) outcomes
are plotted. The Nash equilibrium is the starting point for our bargaining process.
Three different bargaining outcomes achieved by our bargaining process are marked
with squares. The bargaining trajectories from the Nash equilibrium to these outcomes
corresponds to the stages during the bargaining process. The bargaining outcome cannot
be determined prior to the bargaining process and depends on the initializing parameters
such as the initial step-lengths δ(0)k and θk. The bargaining outcomes always dominate
the Nash equilibrium, e.g. BO1, BO2, and BO3. The dashed line connecting joint
MRT and joint ZF points is the trajectory curve of the bargaining algorithm proposed
in [HG08]. In this algorithm both consumers start at the Nash equilibrium (or joint
ZF) and reduce their proposals in equal step-lengths. The algorithm terminates when
at least one link experiences reduction in its payoff. The outcome of this algorithm
starting in Nash equilibrium is marked with a circle.
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Figure 4.10.: SINR region of a two-user MISO IFC with SNR = 0 dB. The bargaining
outcomes are marked with squares for three different initial step-lengths
(δ(0)1 , δ
(0)
2 ). BO1 : (0.02, 0.01), BO2 : (0.015, 0.01), BO3 : (0.01, 0.01).
In Figure 4.11, an Edgeworth box is plotted for the bargaining process in which
the step-lengths are initialized with (δ01 , δ
0
2) = (0.1, 0.1) and the accuracy measure is
ǫ = 10−5. The stage allocations are marked with crosses, and the exchange lens is
bounded by the corresponding indifference curves. The exchange lens reduces in size
after each bargaining-stage until the indifference curves are tangent at the bargaining
outcome. This indicates that the outcome is Pareto optimal. In Figure 4.12, the SINR
values for the same setting as of Figure 4.11 are plotted for increasing bargaining-
steps. The stage outcomes are marked with circles. These are the SINR pairs that
the consumers jointly accept during the bargaining process. The algorithm terminates
after 40 bargaining-steps. However, since the SINRs only increase slightly after half
the bargaining-steps, the bargaining process could be stopped at bargaining-step 20
requiring a total of 80 signaling bits.
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Figure 4.11.: Edgeworth box representation of the bargaining process for (δ(0)1 , δ
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(0.1, 0.1). Two antennas are used at each transmitter and SNR = 0 dB.
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Figure 4.13.: Flowchart for consumer 1 (analogously consumer 2) for a new proposal.
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4.2. Competitive Markets
In this section, we model the situation between two MISO links as a competitive market.
The stable state of a competitive market is called Walrasian equilibrium and lies in the
set of exchange equilibria characterized in the previous section. We continue to interpret
the efficient beamforming parameters as goods in this section. However, opposed to the
previous section where the goods where directly exchanged between the consumers, the
goods in a competitive market are bought and sold by the consumers at given prices.
4.2.1. Competitive Market Model
In a competitive market, the consumers buy quantities of goods and also sell goods they
possess such that they maximize their profit. Each good has a price and every consumer
takes the prices as given. The prices of the goods are not determined by consumers, but
arbitrated by markets. In our case, the arbitrator determines the prices of the goods.
The goods in (4.2) correspond to the parameterizations of the efficient beamforming
vectors. Let pk denote the unit price of good k. In order to be able to buy goods, each
consumer k is endowed with a budget λMRTk pk which is the worth of his initial amounts
of goods6. The budget set of consumer k is the set of bundles of goods he can afford to
buy defined as
Bk :=
{(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
∈ R2+ : x
(k)
1 p1 + x
(k)
2 p2 ≤ λMRTk pk
}
. (4.22)
The budget set of consumer 1 is illustrated by the grey area in Figure 4.14. The boundary
of the budget set is a line which connects the points (λMRT1 , 0) and (0, λ
MRT
1 p1/p2). Thus,
the boundary has a slope of −p1/p2.
For the consumers, the prices of the goods are measures for their qualitative valuation.
If p1 is greater than p2, then good 1 has more value than good 2. Given the prices p1 and
p2, consumer 1 demands the amounts of goods x
(1)
1 and x
(1)
2 such that these maximize
his SINR utility function in (4.6). Thus, consumer k solves the following problem:
maximize φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
subject to p1x
(k)
1 + p2x
(k)
2 ≤ λMRTk pk.
(4.23)
In the above consumer problem, the objective function is the SINR of link k in (4.6),
and the constraint is defined by the budget set of consumer k in (4.22). The physical
interpretation of the budget set constraint can be related to an interference constraint.
6This case corresponds to the Arrow-Debreu market model [Ye07].
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Figure 4.14.: An illustration of the budget set of consumer 1.
Considering consumer 1, the constraint in (4.23) can be reformulated to
x
(1)
1 ≤ λMRT1 −
p2
p1
x
(1)
2 , (4.24)
where, as mentioned before, x(1)1 = λ1 ∈ [0, λMRT1 ] is the scaling of interference transmit-
ter 1 produces at receiver 2. Analogously, x(1)2 = λ
MRT
2 −λ2 is the scaling for interference
reduction from transmitter 2 at receiver 1. Hence, the constraint in (4.24) dictates the
tradeoff between the amount of interference transmitter 1 can generate at receiver 2
and the amount of interference receiver 1 is to tolerate. The prices p1 and p2 can be
interpreted as parameters to control the fairness between the links by regulating the
amount of interference the links generate on each other.
Theorem 3. The unique solution to the problem in (4.23) is
x
∗(1)
1 (p1, p2) =

1 +
ǧ1
g1
(
1 +
g21
p1
p2
σ2 + λMRT2 g21 − λMRT1 g21 p1p2
)2

−1
, (4.25)
x
∗(1)
2 (p1, p2) =
p1
p2
(
λMRT1 − x∗(1)1
)
, (4.26)
for consumer 1, and
x
∗(2)
2 (p1, p2) =

1 +
ǧ2
g2
(
1 +
g12
p2
p1
σ2 + λMRT1 g12 − λMRT2 g12 p2p1
)2

−1
, (4.27)
x
∗(2)
1 (p1, p2) =
p2
p1
(
λMRT2 − x∗(2)2
)
, (4.28)
for consumer 2, where ǧk, gk, gkℓ are defined in Lemma 1. The feasible prices ratio is in
the range:
β :=
λMRT2 g12
σ2 + λMRT1 g12
≤ p1
p2
≤ β := σ
2 + λMRT2 g21
λMRT1 g21
. (4.29)
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Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix 4.3.5.
Theorem 3 characterizes the demand functions of each consumer. In economic theory,
these functions are called Marshallian demand functions [JR03] or Walrasian demand
functions [MCWG95]. Note that each consumer calculates his demands independently
without knowing the other consumer’s demands. From Theorem 3, consumer 1 (analo-
gously consumer 2) needs to know the constants g1, ǧ1, and g21 defined in Lemma 1. The
measure σ2 + λMRT2 g21 in (4.6) is the noise plus interference power in Nash equilibrium.
This measure is reported from receiver 1 to its transmitter in Nash equilibrium which
is the links’ initial state before coordination takes place.
The demand functions of the consumers in Theorem 3 are homogenous of degree zero
[JR03, Definition A2.2] with the prices p1 and p2. That is, the demand of consumer 1
for good 1 (analogously consumer 2 for good 2) satisfies x∗(1)1 (tp1, tp2) = x
∗(1)
1 (p1, p2) for
t > 0. Hence, given only a prices ratio p̄1/p̄2, we can calculate a prices pair as p1 = p̄1/p̄2
and p2 = 1 which leads to the same demand as with p̄1 and p̄2. With this respect, a
consumer need only know the prices ratio p1/p2 from the arbitrator to calculate his
demands. In Figure 4.14, the demand of consumer 1 is illustrated as the point where
the corresponding indifference curve is tangent to the boundary of the budget set.
The next result provides a significant property that the goods in our setting possess.
Later in Section 4.2.2 and Section 4.2.3, this property is required to prove the uniqueness
of the Walrasian equilibrium and also to guarantee the global convergence of the price
adjustment process.
Lemma 2. The goods in our setting are gross substitutes, i.e., increasing the price of
one good increases the demand of the other good.
Proof. Decreasing the ratio p1/p2 can be interpreted as decreasing p1 or increasing p2.
Consider the aggregate excess demand of good 1 defined as
z1(p1, p2) = x
∗(1)
1 (p1, p2) + x
∗(2)
1 (p1, p2) − λMRT1 , (4.30)
where x∗(1)1 (p1, p2) and x
∗(2)
1 (p1, p2) are the demand functions of good 1 in (4.25) and
(4.28) from Theorem 3. If p1/p2 decreases, then x
∗(1)
1 (p1, p2) increases. If p1/p2 de-
creases, then x∗(2)1 (p1, p2) also increases since p2/p1 increases and x
∗(2)
2 (p1, p2) decreases.
Thus, the aggregate excess demand of good 1 in (4.30) increases if p1/p2 decreases. The
analysis is analogous for the second good.
If each consumer is to demand amounts of goods without considering the demands
of the other consumer, then it is important that the consumers’ demands equal the
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Figure 4.15.: An illustration of an Edgeworth box. I1 and I2 are indifference curves of
consumer 1 and 2 respectively. The line with slope -p∗1/p
∗
2 separates the
budget sets of the consumers in Walrasian equilibrium.
consumers’ supply of goods. Prices which fulfill this requirement are called Walrasian
and are calculated next.
4.2.2. Walrasian Equilibrium
In a Walrasian equilibrium, the demand equals the supply of each good [JR03, Definition
5.5]. According to the properties of the utility function in Theorem 1, there exists at
least one Walrasian equilibrium [JR03, Theorem 5.5]. The Walrasian prices (p∗1, p
∗
2) that
lead to a Walrasian equilibrium satisfy
x
∗(1)
1 (p1, p2) + x
∗(2)
1 (p1, p2) = λ
MRT
1 , (4.31)
and x∗(1)2 (p1, p2) + x
∗(2)
2 (p1, p2) = λ
MRT
2 . (4.32)
In our setting in which only two goods exist, Walras’ law [JR03, Chapter 5.2] provides
the property that if the demand equals the supply of one good, then the demand would
equal the supply of the other good. Hence, in order to calculate the Walrasian prices,
it is sufficient to consider only one of the conditions in (4.31) and (4.32).
Theorem 4. The ratio of the Walrasian prices is the unique root of
a
[
p1
p2
]5
+ b
[
p1
p2
]4
+ c
[
p1
p2
]3
+ d
[
p1
p2
]2
+ e
[
p1
p2
]
+ f = 0, (4.33)
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that satisfies the condition in (4.29). The constant coefficients are
a = T1T
2
2 T 3, b = −2T3T2(T2S2 + T1S1),
c = 2T4T2S3 + 4S1S2T2T3 + T1S4T3,
d = −2S4S2T3 − 4T1T2S2S3 − S1T4S3,
e = 2S3S2(T2S2 + T1S1), f = −S1S22S3,
where
T1 = (g1 − ǧ1)/(g1 + ǧ1), T2 = λMRT1 + σ2/g12,
T3 = (1 − λMRT1 )λMRT1 , T4 =
(
ǧ21 − ǧ1g1 + g21
)
/(g1 + ǧ1)
2,
S1 = (g2 − ǧ2)/(g2 + ǧ2), S2 = λMRT2 + σ2/g21,
S3 = (1 − λMRT2 )λMRT2 , S4 =
(
ǧ22 − ǧ2g2 + g22
)
/(g2 + ǧ2)
2,
and ǧk, gk, gkℓ are defined in Lemma 1.
Proof. Substituting (4.25) and (4.28) in (4.31) and collecting p1/p2 we get the expression
in (4.33). The condition in (4.29) states the set of feasible prices such that the demands
of the consumers are feasible. At least one price pair is in this set since a Walrasian
equilibrium always exists in our setting. In addition, having the property that the goods
are gross substitutes in Lemma 2, implies that the Walrasian equilibrium in our setting
is unique [MCWG95, Proposition 17.F.3]. Note that the roots in (4.33) can be easily
calculated using a Newton method. And due to the uniqueness of the Walrasian prices,
only one root satisfies the condition in (4.29).
According to the First Welfare Theorem [JR03, Theorem 5.7], the Walrasian equi-
librium is Pareto optimal. Moreover, linking to the results in the previous section, the
Walrasian equilibrium is an exchange equilibrium [JR03, Theorem 5.6]. In other words,
the Walrasian equilibrium dominates the Nash equilibrium outcome. In Figure 4.15,
the allocation in Walrasian equilibrium which corresponds to the Walrasian prices ratio
p∗1/p
∗
2 is illustrated in the Edgeworth box. It is the point on the contract curve which
intersects the line that passes through the endowment point (Nash equilibrium) with
slope −p∗1/p∗2 (with respect to the coordinate system of consumer 1). The grey area
in Figure 4.15 is the budget set of consumer 1 as described in Figure 4.14. The white
area in the Edgeworth box is the budget set of consumer 2. According to the axis
transformation in constructing the Edgeworth box, the boundaries of the consumers’
budget sets coincide. The indifference curves of the consumers are tangent to this line
and also tangent to one another which illustrates the Pareto optimality of the Walrasian
equilibrium.
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Figure 4.16.: An illustration of the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash bargaining solutions
in the SINR region.
Relation to Axiomatic Bargaining
Two solutions from axiomatic bargaining theory, namely the Nash bargaining solution
(NBS) [Nas50a] and the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution [KS75] are also exchange
equilibria. These solutions differ by the axioms that define them. The interested reader
is referred to [Pet92] for a comprehensive theory on axiomatic bargaining. A bargaining
problem is defined by7 〈Φ, (φNE1 , φNE2 )〉, where Φ is the SINR region in (4.3) and (φNE1 , φNE2 )
is called the threat point which corresponds to the SINR tuple in Nash equilibrium. The
threat point is a state reached if cooperation between the players does not succeed.
The NBS [OR94, Chapter 15] of 〈Φ, (φNE1 , φNE2 )〉 solves the following problem:
maximize (φ1 − φNE1 )(φ2 − φNE2 )
subject to (φ1, φ2) ∈ Φ.
(4.34)
In [LJ08], the NBS solution is selected as a cooperative solution between the two MISO
links. The solution is found graphically by checking the intersection of the Pareto
boundary and the Nash curves. A Nash curve is a set of SINR tuples that satisfy
c = (φ1 − φNE1 )(φ2 − φNE2 ) (4.35)
for a given constant value c. The NBS is the SINR tuple at which the Nash curve touches
the boundary of the SINR region at a single point as is illustrated in Figure 4.16. Note
7In order to simplify the description of the bargaining solutions, we do not explicitly state the depen-
dence of the utility functions on the goods.
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that the NBS is only defined for convex utility regions which ensures a unique solution.
The SINR region Φ in our case is not necessarily convex and therefore multiple solutions
can exist for the problem in (4.34).
The KS solution of the bargaining problem 〈Φ, (φNE1 , φNE2 )〉 solves the following problem
[KS75]:
maximize min
(
φ1 − φNE1
φUP1 − φNE1
,
φ2 − φNE2
φUP2 − φNE2
)
subject to (φ1, φ2) ∈ Φ,
(4.36)
where φUP1 (analogously φ
UP
2 ) is the solution of the following problem:
maximize φ1
subject to (φ1, φ
NE
2 ) ∈ Φ.
(4.37)
The point (φUP1 , φ
UP
2 ) is called the utopia point. As illustrated in Figure 4.16, the two
Pareto optimal points (φUP1 , φ
NE
2 ) and (φ
NE
2 , φ
UP
2 ) are the bounds to the set of exchange
equilibria from Section 4.1.2. Graphically, the KS solution is the intersection of the
Pareto boundary with the line connecting the Nash equilibrium and the utopia point.
In [NS09], the KS solution is found in the MISO IFC by solving a set of convex feasibility
problems.
The properties that the Walrasian equilibrium and the NBS or KS solution have in
common are that they are exchange equilibria, i.e., each user achieves higher utility than
at the Nash equilibrium. The difference between the solutions is the fairness aspects
in allocating the Pareto optimal utilities to the players. The current advantage in the
Walrasian equilibrium over NBS and KS solutions is that it can be characterized in
closed-form using Theorem 3 and Theorem 4. In addition, in the next section we devise
two coordination mechanism to implement the Walrasian equilibrium.
4.2.3. Coordination Mechanism
In this section, we provide two coordination mechanisms which require different amount
of information at the arbitrator. If the arbitrator has full knowledge of all parameters
of the setting, then he can calculate the Walrasian prices from Theorem 4 and forward
these to the transmitters. The transmitters calculate their demands from Theorem
3 and choose the beamforming vectors accordingly. This mechanism that uses the
results in Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 leads directly to the Walrasian equilibrium. In
Table 4.1, the required information at the arbitrator and the transmitters to implement
this one-shot mechanism are listed. We assume that each transmitter forwards the
78
4.2. Competitive Markets
Information
Arbitrator h11, h12, h21, h22, σ2
Transmitter 1 h11, h12, σ2 + λMRT2 ‖h21‖2, ‖h21‖2
Transmitter 2 h22, h21, σ2 + λMRT1 ‖h12‖2, ‖h12‖2
Table 4.1.: Required information at the arbitrator and transmitters to implement the
Walrassian equilibrium in one-shot.
Information
Arbitrator ‖h21‖2, ‖h12‖2, λMRT1 , λMRT2 , σ2
Transmitter 1 h11, h12, σ2 + λMRT2 ‖h21‖2, ‖h21‖2
Transmitter 2 h22, h21, σ2 + λMRT1 ‖h12‖2, ‖h12‖2
Table 4.2.: Required information at the arbitrator and transmitters for the price adjust-
ment process.
channel information it has to the arbitrator. Note that each transmitter k initially
knows the channel vectors hkk and hkℓ, k 6= ℓ, which are required to calculate the efficient
beamforming vectors in (2.9). Also, transmitter k knows the sum σ2+λMRTℓ ‖hℓk‖2, k 6= ℓ,
since this is the noise plus interference in Nash equilibrium forwarded through feedback
from the intended receiver. The arbitrator, which now has full knowledge of all channels,
can then forward the missing information on the channel gain ‖hℓk‖2 to a transmitter
k.
If the arbitrator has limited information about the setting, we could still achieve
the Walrasian prices through an iterative price adjustment process. For fixed arbitrary
initial prices, the transmitters can calculate their demands and forward these to the
arbitrator. The arbitrator exploits the demand information to update the prices of the
goods. Specifically, the arbitrator would increase the price of the good which has higher
demand than its supply. Due to the properties of the goods in Lemma 2, this price ad-
justment process, also called tâtonnement, is globally convergent to the Walrasian prices
given in Theorem 4 [ABH59]. The price adjustment process requires the information
listed in Table 4.2 to be available at the arbitrator and the transmitters. In contrast to
Table 4.1, the arbitrator requires aside from the noise power σ2 only the cross channel
gains ‖h21‖2, ‖h12‖2 and the parameters λMRT1 , λMRT2 from the transmitters. This infor-
mation is required only at the beginning of the price adjustment process in order to
calculate the bounds for the feasible prices β and β given in (4.29).
In Algorithm 1, the price adjustment process is described. This process is essentially
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Algorithm 1: Distributed price adjustment process.
Input: x(1)1 , x
(2)
1 , x
(1)
2 , x
(2)
2
1 initialize: accuracy ǫ, n = 0, β
(0)
= β, β(0) = β in (4.29),
p
(0)
1
p
(0)
2
= β
(0)
2 +
β(0)
2 ;
2 while β
(n) − β(n) > ǫ do
3 receive demands x(1)1 , x
(2)
1 , x
(1)
2 , x
(2)
2 ;
4 n = n + 1;
5 if x
(1)
1 + x
(2)
1 > λ
MRT
1 then
6 β(n) =
p
(n−1)
1
p
(n−1)
2
, β
(n)
= β
(n−1)
;
7
p
(n)
1
p
(n)
2
=
β
(n)
+β(n)
2 ;
8 else
9 β(n) = β(n−1), β
(n)
=
p
(n−1)
1
p
(n−1)
2
;
10
p
(n)
1
p
(n)
2
=
β
(n)
+β(n)
2 ;
Output: p(n)1 /p
(n)
2
a bisection method which finds the roots of the excess demand function described in the
proof of Lemma 2. The accuracy measure conditioning the termination of the algorithm
is defined as ǫ. The terms β and β are the lower and upper bounds on the prices
ratio given in (4.29), respectively. The prices ratio is initialized to the middle value
of these bounds and forwarded to the links. The links send their demands calculated
from Theorem 3 to the arbitrator. If the demand of good 1 is greater than its supply,
then the arbitrator increases the ratio of the prices to half the distance to the upper
bound β. Thus, the price of good 1 relative to the price of good 2 increases. The lower
bound on the prices ratio β is updated to the prices ratio of the previous iteration. If
the demand of good 1 is less than its supply, the prices ratio is decremented half the
distance to the lower bound β. The upper bound β is set to the prices ratio of the
previous iteration. The algorithm terminates when the distance between the updated
upper and lower bounds on the prices ratio is below the accuracy measure ǫ.
In Figure 4.17, the prices ratio in the price adjustment process is marked with a
cross and is shown to converge after a few iterations to the Walrasian prices ratio from
Theorem 4. The dashed lines correspond to the upper and lower bounds in (4.29).
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Figure 4.17.: Convergence of the price ratio in the price adjustment process to the Wal-
rasian price ratio.
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Figure 4.18.: Edgeworth box which depicts the allocation for the Walrasian prices.
Simulation Results
In Figure 4.18, an Edgeworth box is plotted for sample channel realizations with two
transmit antennas at each transmitter. For the prices calculated from Theorem 4 we ob-
tain the Walrasian equilibrium allocation on the contract curve where the corresponding
indifference curves are tangent. The indifference curves are obtained from Proposition
3. The line passing through the Walrasian equilibrium allocation defines the budget sets
of the consumers as is illustrated in Figure 4.15.
In Figure 4.19, the SINR region is plotted. The points lying inside the SINR region
correspond to the beamforming vectors in (4.1), where a subset of these points are
Pareto optimal. The Pareto boundary corresponds to the allocations on the contract
curve calculated in Theorem 2. The exchange equilibria are all Pareto optimal points
that dominate the Nash equilibrium (joint MRT). Assuming the links are rational, only
exchange equilibria are of interest for the links. In other words, the links will not cooper-
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Figure 4.19.: SINR region of a two-user MISO IFC with SNR = 0 dB and two antennas
at the transmitters.
ate if one link would achieve lower payoff than at the Nash equilibrium. The Walrasian
equilibrium from Theorem 4 is an exchange equilibrium. In Figure 4.19, we also plot
the maximum sum SINR which is obtained by grid search over the allocations on the
Pareto boundary. The virtual SINR coordination point corresponds to the coordina-
tion mechanism in [ZG09], where the minimum mean square error (MMSE) transmit
beamforming vectors
wMMSEk =
[σ2I + hkℓh
H
kℓ]
−1hkk
‖[σ2I + hkℓhHkℓ]−1hkk‖
, k 6= ℓ, (4.38)
are proven to achieve a Pareto optimal point. These beamforming vectors require only
local CSI at the transmitters which is an appealing property in terms of the low overhead
in information exchange between the links. In Figure 4.19, it can be seen that the
virtual SINR coordination and the maximum sum SINR points are both not necessarily
exchange equilibria. Hence, these points are not suitable for distributed implementation
between the rational links.
In Figure 4.19, the NBS and KS solution are plotted. These solutions are exchange
equilibria and according to simulations, these two solutions are not far from each other.
Note that the NBS is defined for convex utility regions only, and the SINR region Φ
in our case is not necessarily convex as is shown in Figure 4.19. However, solving the
optimization problem in (4.34) by grid search over 103 generated Pareto optimal points
from Theorem 2 gives a single solution which we plot in Figure 4.19. The two Pareto
optimal points (φUP1 , φ
NE
2 ) and (φ
NE
2 , φ
UP
2 ) are the bounds to the core and are marked with
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circles on the Pareto boundary in Figure 4.19. These bounds, as discussed in Section
4.1.1, can be calculated in the Edgeworth box as the intersection of the contract curve
and the indifference curves corresponding to the Nash equilibrium. The KS solution
which solves the problem in (4.36) using the core bounds is then found by grid search
over the generated Pareto optimal points from Theorem 2.
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4.3. Proofs
4.3.1. Proof of Lemma 1
The direct and interference power gains, |hHkkwk(λk)|2 and |hHkℓwk(λk)|2, k 6= ℓ, are
calculated as functions of the parameters λk by using the expression for the beamforming
vectors in (2.9). The direct power gain is calculated as:
|hHkkwk(λk)|2 =
(
√
λk
hHkkΠhkℓhkk
‖Πhkℓhkk‖
+
√
1 − λk
hHkkΠ
⊥
hkℓ
hkk
‖Π⊥hkℓhkk‖
)2
=
(√
λk‖Πhkℓhkk‖ +
√
1 − λk‖Π⊥hkℓhkk‖
)2
. (4.39)
The interference power is:
|hHkℓwk(λk)|2 =
∣∣∣∣∣
√
λk
hHkℓΠhkℓhkk
‖Πhkℓhkk‖
+
√
1 − λk
hHkℓΠ
⊥
hkℓ
hkk
‖Π⊥hkℓhkk‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2
= λk
|hHkℓΠhkℓhkk|2
‖Πhkℓhkk‖2
= λk‖hkℓ‖2. (4.40)
These expressions lead to (4.4) and (4.5) in Lemma 1.
4.3.2. Proof of Theorem 1
First, it is easy to see that the SINR expression in (4.6) is continuous. The SINR
φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
is strongly increasing with the goods x(k)1 and x
(k)
2 if φk
(
x′(k)1 , x
′(k)
2
)
>
φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
whenever
(
x′(k)1 , x
′(k)
2
)
6=
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
and
(
x′(k)1 , x
′(k)
2
)
≥
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
[JR03, Definition A1.17]. Define the directional derivative of φk at
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
in direc-
tion z as
∇zφk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
= lim
t→0
φk
((
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
+ tz
)
− φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
t
. (4.41)
Since φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
is differentiable, the limit above can be given as [JR03, Chapter
A.2]
∇zφk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
= ∇φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
z, (4.42)
where ∇φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
is the gradient of φk at
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
written as
∇φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
=


∂φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
∂x
(k)
k
,
∂φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
∂x
(k)
ℓ

, (4.43)
with ℓ 6= k. The directional derivative of φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
defines the slope of the tan-
gent to φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
at the point
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
in the direction z. Hence, if the direc-
tional derivative is positive for z = (z1, z2)T with z1 and z2 nonnegative and satisfying
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‖z‖ =
√
z21 + z
2
2 = 1, then the utility function φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
is strongly increasing. Con-
sequently, the directional derivative in (4.42) is strictly positive if the components of the
gradient ∇φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
are strictly positive. The first component of ∇φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
is
∂φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
∂x
(k)
k
=
(√
x
(k)
k gk +
√(
1 − x(k)k
)
ǧk
)(√
gk
x
(k)
k
−
√
ǧk
1−x(k)
k
)
σ2 + λMRTℓ gℓk − x
(k)
ℓ gℓk
. (4.44)
The partial derivative in (4.44) is strictly larger than zero when x(k)k < gk/(ǧk + gk).
Substituting ǧk and gk from Lemma 1 we get
x
(k)
k <
gk
ǧk + gk
=
‖Πhkℓhkk‖2
‖hkk‖2
= λMRTk . (4.45)
Since x(k)k ∈ [0, λMRTk ], the partial derivative in (4.44) is strictly larger than zero except
for x(k)k = λ
MRT
k . The second component of ∇φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
is
∂φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
∂x
(k)
ℓ
= gℓk
(√
x
(k)
k gk +
√(
1 − x(k)k
)
ǧk
)2
(
σ2 + λMRTℓ gℓk − x
(k)
ℓ gℓk
)2 , (4.46)
with ℓ 6= k, which is strictly larger than zero for x(k)ℓ ∈ [0, λMRTℓ ]. Hence, the directional
derivative in (4.42) is strictly positive for
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
∈ [0, λMRT1 ]×[0, λMRT2 ] except for the
case x(k)k = λ
MRT
k and z = (1, 0). Since λ
MRT
k is the upper bound on x
(k)
k , the slope of the
function φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
in the direction x(k)k as is restricted by the condition z = (1, 0)
is not of interest.
Next, we will prove that the SINR function is jointly quasiconcave with the goods
by proving that the SINR is strictly pseudoconcave. Consider the SINR expression in
(4.6), and define
f
(
x
(k)
k
)
:=
(√
x
(k)
k gk +
√(
1 − x(k)k
)
ǧk
)2
, (4.47)
g
(
x
(k)
ℓ
)
:= σ2 + λMRTℓ gℓk − x(k)ℓ gℓk. (4.48)
The function φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
= f
(
x
(k)
k
)
/g
(
x
(k)
ℓ
)
is strictly pseudoconcave if f
(
x
(k)
k
)
is dif-
ferentiable and strictly concave and g
(
x
(k)
ℓ
)
is differentiable and convex [Sch83, Propo-
sition 2]. It is clear that g
(
x
(k)
ℓ
)
and f
(
x
(k)
k
)
are differentiable. The function g
(
x
(k)
ℓ
)
is convex since it is linear in x(k)ℓ . In order to show that f
(
x
(k)
k
)
is strictly concave, we
85
Chapter 4. Microeconomic Theory Applications
build the second derivative of f
(
x
(k)
k
)
as follows:
d2f
(
x
(k)
k
)
d2x(k)k
=
(√
gk/x
(k)
k −
√
ǧk/
(
1 − x(k)k
))2
−
(√
x
(k)
k gk +
√(
1 − x(k)k
)
ǧk
)

√√√√
gk(
x
(k)
k
)3 +
√√√√
ǧk(
1 − x(k)k
)3


=
gk
x
(k)
k
+
ǧk(
1 − x(k)k
) − 2
√√√√
gk ǧk(
1 − x(k)k
)(
x
(k)
k
) − gk
x
(k)
k
(4.49)
− ǧk(
1 − x(k)k
) −
√√√√√√
(
1 − x(k)k
)
gkǧk
(
x
(k)
k
)3 −
√√√√√
x
(k)
k gkǧk(
1 − x(k)k
)3 (4.50)
= −2
√√√√
gkǧk(
1 − x(k)k
)(
x
(k)
k
) −
√√√√√√
(
1 − x(k)k
)
gkǧk
(
x
(k)
k
)3 −
√√√√√
x
(k)
k gkǧk(
1 − x(k)k
)3 < 0.
The second derivative of f
(
x
(k)
k
)
is strictly less than zero. Thus, f
(
x
(k)
k
)
is strictly
concave. Accordingly, φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
is strictly pseudoconcave.
4.3.3. Proof of Proposition 3
The indifference curve I1 (analogously for consumer 2) for a given utility φ′1 satisfies
φ′1 =
(√
x
(1)
1 g1 +
√(
1 − x(1)1
)
ǧ1
)2
f
(
x
(1)
2
) , (4.51)
where f
(
x
(1)
2
)
= σ2 + λMRT2 g21 − x
(1)
2 g21. We need to solve for x
(1)
1 in (4.51). Cross
multiplying the terms in (4.51) we get
φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
)
= x(1)1 g1 +
(
1 − x(1)1
)
ǧ1 + 2
√
x
(1)
1 g1
(
1 − x(1)1
)
ǧ1, (4.52)
2
√
x
(1)
1 g1
(
1 − x(1)1
)
ǧ1 = φ
′
1f
(
x
(1)
2
)
− x(1)1 g1 −
(
1 − x(1)1
)
ǧ1, (4.53)
4x(1)1 g1
(
1 − x(1)1
)
ǧ1 =
(
φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
)
− x(1)1 g1 −
(
1 − x(1)1
)
ǧ1
)2
. (4.54)
Collecting the terms x(1)1 and
(
x
(1)
1
)2
we get the following quadratic equation
(
x
(1)
1
)2
(g1 + ǧ1)
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
−2x(1)1
(
(g1 − ǧ1)
(
φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
)
− ǧ1
)
+ 2g1ǧ1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B1
+
(
φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
)
− ǧ1
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C1
= 0.
(4.55)
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The two solutions of the above equation are
x
(1)
1 =
B1 ±
√
B21 − A1C1
A1
=
B1
A1
±
√
B21 − A1C1
A21
. (4.56)
The product of the two solutions in (4.56) is C1/A1 > 0 which means that both roots
have the same sign. Knowing that one root has to be in the set [0, λMRT1 ] from (4.1),
then both roots have to be positive. Therefore, the smallest solution from (4.56) is of
interest written as
x
(1)
1 =
B1
A1
−
√
B21 − A1C1
A21
. (4.57)
Calculating B1/A1 we get
B1
A1
=
(g1 − ǧ1)
(
φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
)
− ǧ1
)
+ 2g1ǧ1
(g1 + ǧ1)
2 , (4.58)
=
g1φ
′
1f
(
x
(1)
2
)
+ ǧ1
(
g1 + ǧ1 − φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
))
(g1 + ǧ1)
2 , (4.59)
=
g1φ
′
1f
(
x
(1)
2
)
+ (g1 + ǧ1 − g1)
(
g1 + ǧ1 − φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
))
(g1 + ǧ1)
2 , (4.60)
= λMRT1
φ′1
φ1
(
λMRT1 , x
(1)
2
) + (1 − λMRT1 )

1 − φ
′
1
φ1
(
λMRT1 , x
(1)
2
)

, (4.61)
since g1/(g1 + ǧ1) = λMRT1 and
g1 + ǧ1
f
(
x
(1)
2
) =
‖hkk‖2
σ2 + λMRT2 g21 − x
(1)
2 g21
= φ1
(
λMRT1 , x
(1)
2
)
. (4.62)
The discriminant delta ∆1 = B1 − A1C1 is calculated as
∆1 =
(
(g1 − ǧ1)
(
φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
)
− ǧ1
)
+ 2g1ǧ1
)2
− (g1 + ǧ1)2
(
φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
)
− ǧ1
)2
, (4.63)
=
((
(g1 − ǧ1)
(
φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
)
− ǧ1
)
+ 2g1ǧ1
)
− (g1 + ǧ1)
(
φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
)
− ǧ1
))
×
((
(g1 − ǧ1)
(
φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
)
− ǧ1
)
+ 2g1ǧ1
)
+ (g1 + ǧ1)
(
φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
)
− ǧ1
))
, (4.64)
=
((
φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
)
− ǧ1
)
(g1 − ǧ1 − g1 − ǧ1) + 2g1ǧ1
)
×
((
φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
)
− ǧ1
)
(g1 − ǧ1 + g1 + ǧ1) + 2g1ǧ1
)
, (4.65)
= 2ǧ1
(
g1 + ǧ1 − φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
))
2g1
(
φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
))
, (4.66)
= 4ǧ1g1
(
g1 + ǧ1 − φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
))(
φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
))
. (4.67)
87
Chapter 4. Microeconomic Theory Applications
Calculating ∆1/A21 we get
B1 − A1C1
A21
=
4ǧ1g1
(
g1 + ǧ1 − φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
))(
φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
))
(g1 + ǧ1)
4 , (4.68)
= 4
(g1 + ǧ1 − g1)
(g1 + ǧ1)
g1
(g1 + ǧ1)
(
g1 + ǧ1 − φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
))
(g1 + ǧ1)
(
φ′1f
(
x
(1)
2
))
(g1 + ǧ1)
, (4.69)
= 4(1 − λMRT1 )λMRT1

1 − φ
′
1
φ1
(
λMRT1 , x
(1)
2
)

 φ
′
1
φ1
(
λMRT1 , x
(1)
2
) . (4.70)
Substituting (4.61) and (4.70) in (4.57) we get
x
(1)
1 = λ
MRT
1
φ′1
φ1
(
λMRT1 , x
(1)
2
) + (1 − λMRT1 )

1 − φ
′
1
φ1
(
λMRT1 , x
(1)
2
)


− 2
√√√√√(1 − λMRT1 )λMRT1

1 − φ
′
1
φ1
(
λMRT1 , x
(1)
2
)

 φ
′
1
φ1
(
λMRT1 , x
(1)
2
) , (4.71)
=


√√√√λMRT1
φ′1
φ1
(
λMRT1 , x
(1)
2
) −
√√√√√(1 − λMRT1 )

1 − φ
′
1
φ1
(
λMRT1 , x
(1)
2
)




2
, (4.72)
which concludes the proof.
4.3.4. Proof of Theorem 2
The partial derivatives of φ1
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2
)
w.r.t. x(1)1 and x
(1)
2 are calculated respectively
as
∂φ1
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2
)
∂x
(1)
1
=
√
x
(1)
1 g1 +
√(
1 − x(1)1
)
ǧ1
σ2 + λMRT2 g21 − x
(1)
2 g21
×
√
g1/x
(1)
1 −
√
ǧ1/
(
1 − x(1)1
)
σ2 + λMRT2 g21 − x
(1)
2 g21
,
(4.73)
∂φ1
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2
)
∂x
(1)
2
=
(√
x
(1)
1 g1 +
√(
1 − x(1)1
)
ǧ1
)2
g21
(
σ2 + λMRT2 g21 − x
(1)
2 g21
)2 . (4.74)
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The partial derivatives of φ2
(
x
(2)
1 , x
(2)
2
)
w.r.t. x(2)1 and x
(2)
2 are computed analogously.
We rewrite condition (4.10) to
(√
g1
x
(1)
1
−
√
ǧ1
1−x(1)1
)(
σ2
g21
+ λMRT2 − x
(1)
2
)
(√
x
(1)
1 g1 +
√(
1 − x(1)1
)
ǧ1
) =
(√
x
(2)
2 g2 +
√(
1 − x(2)2
)
ǧ2
)
(√
g2
x
(2)
2
−
√
ǧ2
1−x(2)2
)(
σ2
g12
+ λMRT1 − x
(2)
1
) ,
(4.75)
which after rearranging the terms gives
(√
g1
x
(1)
1
−
√
ǧ1
1−x(1)1
)(
σ2
g12
+ λMRT1 − x
(2)
1
)
(√
x
(1)
1 g1 +
√(
1 − x(1)1
)
ǧ1
) =
(√
x
(2)
2 g2 +
√(
1 − x(2)2
)
ǧ2
)
(√
g2
x
(2)
2
−
√
ǧ2
1−x(2)2
)(
σ2
g21
+ λMRT2 − x
(1)
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
.
(4.76)
We define the RHS of (4.76) as C which is a function of x(2)2 since the term x
(1)
2 =
λMRT2 − x
(2)
2 from (4.2). Using the definitions in (4.2), we rewrite (4.76) as


√
g1
x
(1)
1
−
√√√√
ǧ1(
1 − x(1)1
)


(
σ2
g12
+ x(1)1
)
= C
(√
x
(1)
1 g1 +
√(
1 − x(1)1
)
ǧ1
)
. (4.77)
Multiplying both sides of (4.77) with x(1)1
(
1 − x(1)1
)
we get
(√
(1 − x(1)1 )g1 −
√
x
(1)
1 ǧ1
)(
σ2/g12 + x
(1)
1
)
=
C
(
x
(1)
1
√
(1 − x(1)1 )g1 + (1 − x
(1)
1 )
√
x
(1)
1 ǧ1
)
. (4.78)
Collecting the terms under the square root we get
√(
1 − x(1)1
)
g1
(
σ2
g12
+ x(1)1 − Cx
(1)
1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
=
√
x
(1)
1 ǧ1
(
σ2
g12
+ x(1)1 + C
(
1 − x(1)1
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
. (4.79)
Square both sides of the equation, on the condition that both sides have the same sign
(
1 − x(1)1
)
g1
(
σ2
g12
+ x(1)1 − Cx
(1)
1
)2
= x(1)1 ǧ1
(
σ2
g12
+ x(1)1 + C
(
1 − x(1)1
))2
. (4.80)
Collecting x(1)1 we get the cubic equation in (4.11) with the coefficients in (4.12)-(4.14).
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4.3.5. Proof of Theorem 3
Since the function φk
(
x
(k)
1 , x
(k)
2
)
is strictly quasiconcave from Theorem 1, then this
function has a unique maximum. Considering consumer 1 (analogously consumer 2),
the Lagrangian function to the constrained optimization problem in (4.23) is
L
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2 , µ
)
= φ1
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2
)
+ µ
(
λMRT1 p1 − x(1)1 p1 − x
(1)
2 p2
)
, (4.81)
where µ is a Lagrange multiplier. The Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions for
optimality are given as:
∂L
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2 , µ
)
∂x
(1)
1
=
∂φ1
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2
)
∂x
(1)
1
− µp1 = 0 (4.82)
∂L
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2 , µ
)
∂x
(1)
2
=
∂φ1
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2
)
∂x
(1)
2
+ µp2 = 0 (4.83)
∂L
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2 , µ
)
∂µ
= λMRT1 p1 − x
(1)
1 p1 − x
(1)
2 p2 = 0 (4.84)
In Section 4.3.2, we proved that the SINR function is strictly pseudoconcave with the
goods. Thus, the KKT conditions for the problem in (4.23) are also sufficient for opti-
mality [Sch83, Proposition 3]. According to conditions (4.82) and (4.83), we get
∂φ1
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2
)
∂x
(1)
1
1
p1
= −
∂φ1
(
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2
)
∂x
(1)
2
1
p2
(4.85)
⇒
(√
x
(1)
1 g1 +
√(
1 − x(1)1
)
ǧ1
)

√
g1√
x
(1)
1
−
√
ǧ1√
1−x(1)1


σ2 + λMRT2 g21 − x
(1)
2 g21
=
(√
x
(1)
1 g1 +
√(
1 − x(1)1
)
ǧ1
)2
g21
(
σ2 + λMRT2 g21 − x
(1)
2 g21
)2
p1
p2
(4.86)
⇒
√
g1√
x
(1)
1
−
√
ǧ1√
1 − x(1)1
=
(√
x
(1)
1 g1 +
√(
1 − x(1)1
)
ǧ1
)
g21
(
σ2 + λMRT2 g21 − x
(1)
2 g21
) p1
p2
. (4.87)
Substituting x(1)2 from (4.84) we get
√(
1 − x(1)1
)
g1 −
√
x
(1)
1 ǧ1 =
(
x
(1)
1
√(
1 − x(1)1
)
g1 +
(
1 − x(1)1
)√
x
(1)
1 ǧ1
)


σ2
g21
+ λMRT2 − λMRT1
p1
p2︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
+x(1)1
p1
p2


p1
p2
, (4.88)
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which leads to
√(
1 − x(1)1
)
g1B −
√
x
(1)
1 ǧ1B − x
(1)
1
p1
p2
√
x
(1)
1 ǧ1 =
(
1 − x(1)1
)√
x
(1)
1 ǧ1
p1
p2
(4.89)
√
x
(1)
1 ǧ1
(
B +
p1
p2
)
=
√(
1 − x(1)1
)
g1B. (4.90)
Squaring both sides on the condition that B ≥ 0 we can write
x
(1)
1 ǧ1
(
B +
p1
p2
)2
=
(
1 − x(1)1
)
g1B
2. (4.91)
We solve for x(1)1 to get
x
(1)
1 =
(
1 +
ǧ1
g1
(
1 +
p1
p2B
)2)−1
. (4.92)
Substituting B from (4.88) we get the expression in (4.25). x(1)2 is calculated according
to (4.84).
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Chapter 5.
Conclusions
We consider the MISO IFC in which multiple links operate concurrently in the same
spectral band. We assume single-user decoding capabilities at the receivers, i.e., the
receivers treat interference as noise. Moreover, each transmitter has perfect local CSI
such that each transmitter knows the channels between itself and all receivers perfectly.
This setting is strictly competitive and can be suitably analyzed using tools from game
theory and microeconomic theory.
Our interest in this thesis has been in the joint beamforming design at the transmitters
such that Pareto optimal solutions are attained. At a Pareto optimal point, a change
in the beamforming vectors of the transmitters leads to a degradation in performance
to at least one link. With this respect, Pareto optimality ensures efficient exploitation
of the available resources.
Noncooperative games in the MISO IFC are modeled by games in strategic form. The
Nash equilibrium of a strategic game determines the noncooperative choice of strategies
of the players (links). A link in the MISO IFC is noncooperative if its transmission does
not take into account the interference it generates at other links. We reveal that non-
cooperative operation of the links corresponding to joint MRT is generally not efficient.
This fact drives us to design coordination and cooperation mechanisms to improve the
joint performance of the links from the Nash equilibrium. We prove that for a specific
design of constraints at the transmitters, the Nash equilibrium can be improved. Specif-
ically, we characterize the necessary null-shaping constraints on the strategy space of
each transmitter such that the Nash equilibrium outcome is Pareto optimal. The null
shaping constraints are to be set by an arbitrator which is an existing authority that
coordinates the strategies of the transmitters.
In contrast to strategic games, coalitional games in game theory provide cooperative
solutions between the players. We study cooperation between the links via coalitional
games without transferable utility. In coalitional games, a player has an incentive to
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cooperate with other players if this improves his payoff. We model the setting as a game
in coalitional form without transferable utility. The players in a coalition either perform
ZF transmission or WF precoding to each other. Necessary and sufficient conditions, in
terms of a lower SNR threshold, are provided under which all players have the incentive
to cooperate and form a grand coalition with ZF transmission. In addition, we provide
sufficient conditions under which all players have no incentive to cooperate. In this case,
the SNR has to be below a specified SNR threshold. Hence, there exists an SNR range in
which the links would profit in forming subcoalitions. Therefore, we turn our attention to
coalition formation games between the links. We utilize a coalition formation algorithm,
called merge-and-split, to determine stable user grouping. Numerical results show that
while in the low SNR regime noncooperation is efficient with single-player coalitions, in
the high SNR regime all users benefit in forming a grand coalition. Coalition formation
shows its significance in the mid SNR regime where subset user cooperation provides
joint performance gains.
The conflict between two links in the MISO IFC can be related to models from mi-
croeconomic theory. In such models, general equilibrium theory is used to determine
equilibrium measures that are Pareto optimal. First, we consider the links to be con-
sumers that can trade goods within themselves. The goods in our setting correspond
to the parameters of the beamforming vectors necessary to achieve all Pareto optimal
points in the SINR region. We utilize the Edgeworth box to illustrate the allocation
of the goods between the consumers. Pareto optimal allocations in the Edgeworth box
correspond to the contract curve which we characterize in closed-form. The exchange
equilibria are a subset of the points on the Pareto boundary at which both consumers
achieve larger utility than at the Nash equilibrium. The set of exchange equilibria is
related to the core concept in coalitional games. Thus, the exchange equilibria are ac-
ceptable cooperative outcomes for a bargaining process between the two consumers. We
propose a decentralized bargaining process between the consumers which starts at the
Nash equilibrium and ends at an outcome arbitrarily close to an exchange equilibrium.
This process requires four-bit signaling between the transmitters at each bargaining-step.
The design of the bargaining process relies on a systematic study of the allocations in
the Edgeworth box. In comparison to existing bargaining approaches, our bargaining
outcome is arbitrarily close to the Pareto boundary of the SINR region.
We model the situation between the links as a competitive market which extends
the exchange model to define prices for the goods. The equilibrium in this economy is
called Walrasian and corresponds to the prices that equate the demand to the supply
of goods. We characterize the unique Walrasian equilibrium and propose a coordina-
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tion process that is realized by the arbitrator to distribute the Walrasian prices to the
consumers. The consumers then calculate in a decentralized manner their optimal de-
mand corresponding to beamforming vectors to achieve the Walrasian equilibrium. This
outcome is Pareto optimal and lies in the set of exchange equilibria. Accordingly, the
Walrasian equilibrium shares similar properties with the Nash bargaining solution and
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution from axiomatic bargaining theory.
Game theoretic models as well as models from microeconomic theory are successfully
applied to the beamforming problem in the MISO IFC. Performance improvement from
the Nash equilibrium can be achieved whenever cooperation between the links or coor-
dination from an arbitrator is possible. While the game theoretic results are applicable
for the K-user MISO IFC, the models from microeconomic theory have been applied
only for the two-user case. Next, we discuss open problems and extensions of our results.
5.1. Open Problems
While the tools in microeconomic theory can be applied to general K consumer and n
goods economy as can be found in [JR03, MCWG95], the application to the beamforming
problem in the MISO IFC can currently be done only for the two-user case. This
is mainly because of the structure of the parametrization available for the efficient
beamforming vectors in the general case.
Using the parametrization in (2.9) for two-users, we have chosen the amount of good
for consumer 1 in Section 4.1.1 as x(1)1 = λ1 and the amount of good for consumer 2 from
good 1 as x(2)1 = λ
MRT
1 − λ1. With this relation between the parameters and the goods
and due to the structure of the expression in (4.1), the SINR in (4.6) for link 1 depends
only on x(1)1 and x
(1)
2 which are the amounts from good 1 and good 2 for consumer 1.
This method of defining the goods in terms of the parameters does not carry on for the
K-user MISO IFC case. We illustrate this drawback based on an example in the 3-user
case. The parametrization for the beamforming vectors from (2.12) are
w1(ξ11, ξ12, ξ13) = vmax
(
ξ11h11h
H
11 − ξ12ξ12h12hH12 − ξ13h13hH13
)
w2(ξ21, ξ22, ξ23) = vmax
(
−ξ21h21hH21 + ξ22ξ22h22hH22 − ξ23h23hH23
)
w3(ξ31, ξ32, ξ33) = vmax
(
−ξ31h31hH31 − ξ32ξ32h32hH32 + ξ33h33hH33
)
(5.1)
where ξk1 +ξk2 +ξk3 = 1, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Note that different real-valued parameterizations
are also provided in [SCP11, ZC10, BBO12] which also lead to the same conclusion in
terms of the application of the exchange economy model. We use the parametrization
in (5.1) in order to highlight the usage of the different parameters. In (5.1), three goods
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can be directly distinguished each corresponding to the parameters of each transmitter.
We can choose the amount of good 1 (analogously for goods 2 and 3) to be divided
between the three links as x(1)1 = ξ11 for link 1, x
(2)
1 = ξ12 for link 2, and x
(3)
1 = ξ13
for link 3. In order to model this setting as an exchange economy, the utility (SINR)
of link k should only depend on the amounts of goods x(k)1 , x
(k)
2 , x
(k)
3 . However, with
the parametrization in (5.1), the SINR expression of a link k would depend on all
parameters. Hence, in formulating the demand of consumer k as is done in the two-
user case in (4.23), the solution depends also on the demands of the other consumers.
In this case, each consumer cannot find his optimal demand of goods independently
without knowing what the other consumers demand. Due to this fact, it is currently
not possible to find the Walrasian equilibrium in the general K-user MISO IFC case. A
new parametrization of the beamforming vectors should be devised that is suitable for
modeling the parameters of the efficient beamforming vectors as goods.
The extension of our results to the MIMO IFC requires a characterization of the
efficient beamforming vector for this case. Currently there exists no parametrization
for the necessary beamforming vectors to achieve all points on the Pareto boundary
of the MIMO IFC rate region. As most of our results in the MISO IFC rely on the
parametrization of the efficient beamforming vectors, providing a parametrization in
the MIMO IFC is important. Currently, the only work which exists that deals with this
problem is [CJS12]. In [CJS12], the Pareto boundary of the two-user MIMO IFC rate
region with single stream beamforming is characterized by an approach of maximizing
the rate of a single link while fixing the rate of the other link. Due to the coupling in
the optimizations of the transmitters, an iterative alternating algorithm is used which
solves at each instant a quadratically constrained quadratic program (QCQP) at each
transmitter.
In this thesis, we have assumed perfect CSI at the transmitters. Extensions towards
more practical assumptions such as partial or imperfect CSI at the transmitters is es-
sential. Another extension of our results is to consider multi-user decoding (MUD)
capabilities at the receivers. An investigation would be interesting whether the microe-
conomic models used in Chapter 4 are applicable for the parametrization in [HGJM11]
in order to derive Pareto optimal coordination or cooperation mechanisms.
96
Appendix A.
Further Contributions
During the period of my Ph.D. studies, I have been involved in further publications which
have not been included in this theses. The reason for not including the corresponding
contributions is to restrict our analysis to a unified system model of the MISO IFC on
which models from game theory and microeconomic theory are applied. Here, we list
the further contributions.
In [DMSG11] and [DSMG09] results from my Diploma thesis under the supervision
of Dr. Waltenegus Dargie have been published. My Diploma thesis has been concerned
with the development of an energy-efficient topology control protocol for wireless sensor
networks.
[DMSG11] W. Dargie, R. Mochaourab, A. Schill, and L. Guan, “A topology con-
trol protocol based on eligibility and efficiency metrics,” Journal of
Systems and Software, vol. 84, no. 1, pp. 2–11, 2011.
[DSMG09] W. Dargie, A. Schill, R. Mochaourab, and L. Guan, “A topology con-
trol protocol for 2D Poisson distributed wireless sensor networks,” in
Proc. IEEE AINA Workshops, May 2009, pp. 582–587.
In [JMM09] and the journal version [JMM10], the maximization of the effective capac-
ity in a single-user MIMO system is conducted with partial CSI at the transmitter. The
effective capacity is a performance measure which takes into account the communication
delay.
[JMM09] E. A. Jorswieck, R. Mochaourab, and M. Mittelbach, “Effective capac-
ity maximization in multi-antenna channels with covariance feedback,”
in Proc. IEEE ICC, Jun. 2009, pp. 1–5.
[JMM10] E. A. Jorswieck, R. Mochaourab, and M. Mittelbach, “Effective capac-
ity maximization in multi-antenna channels with covariance feedback,”
IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 9, no. 10, pp. 2988–2993, 2010.
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In [LJLM09], noncooperative and cooperative game theoretic models are presented
for conflict analysis and resource allocation in the interference channel. This work has
been a motivation for me to utilize game theoretic tools in the MISO IFC.
[LJLM09] E. G. Larsson, E. A. Jorswieck, J. Lindblom, and R. Mochaourab,
“Game theory and the flat-fading Gaussian interference channel,”
IEEE Signal Process. Mag., vol. 26, no. 5, pp. 18–27, Sep. 2009.
In [JM09b], a strategic game is studied in the two-user MISO IFC with eavesdropping
possibilities at the receivers. The achievable secrecy rate region is characterized. It is
shown that the Nash equilibrium in this setting is more efficient than in the case without
considering secrecy.
[JM09b] E. A. Jorswieck and R. Mochaourab, “Secrecy rate region of MISO
interference channel: Pareto boundary and non-cooperative games,” in
Proc. 13th International ITG Workshop on Smart Antennas (WSA),
Feb. 2009.
In [JM09a] and [MJ09], a setting is considered in which two cells operate on protected
and shared bands. Each cell can use two frequency bands. One band is for exclusive
use and the other band is shared with the other cell. In each cell, a single user is
selected for transmission based on its channel conditions. In [JM09a], the problem of
the manipulability of the Nash equilibrium by user cheating is studied. Results from
mechanism design are applied to force truthful feedback from the users. In [MJ09], the
Nash equilibrium in this setting is analyzed regarding uniqueness, global stability and
efficiency. Properties from supermodular games are exploited for this purpose.
[JM09a] E. A. Jorswieck and R. Mochaourab, “Power control game in protected
and shared bands: Manipulability of Nash equilibrium,” in Proc. 1st
International Conference on Game Theory for Networks (GameNets),
May. 2009, pp. 428–437, invited.
[MJ09] R. Mochaourab and E. A. Jorswieck, “Resource allocation in protected
and shared bands: Uniqueness and efficiency of Nash equilibria,” in
Proc. 3rd ICST/ACM International Workshop on Game Theory in
Communication Networks (Gamecomm), Oct. 2009, pp. 1–10.
In [MCJ10] and the journal version [CMJ10], noncooperative games in the two-user
SISO IFC are studied. Energy-efficiency is achieved when each system pays a price pro-
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